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UNION NEUTRALITY LAW OR EMPLOYER GAG LAW?
EXPLORING NLRA PREEMPTION OF NEW YORK LABOR LAW
SECTION 211-A
Debra Charish*
INTRODUCTION
Union membership has declined sharply during the past several
decades.1 Organized labor is presently seeking out new and unique
ways to rebuild labor’s numbers.2 One specific method organized
labor has discovered to reinforce its ranks is to press state
legislatures for so-called “union neutrality” laws that appear to
favor unions.3 One such law is New York State’s Labor Law
Section 211-a.4 In 1996, the New York legislature enacted Section
*

Brooklyn Law School Class of 2007; B.A. in Industrial and Labor
Relations, Cornell University, 2004. The author would like to thank her family
and friends for their enduring love and support. She would also like to thank
the various practioners for their assistance in answering her questions,
as well as the staff and editors of the Journal of Law and Policy for
their diligence and support.
1
See Charles B. Craver, Rearranging Deck Chairs on the Titanic: The
Inadequacy of Modest Proposals to Reform Labor Law, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1616
(May 1995) (noting that the union density rate has declined from a high of 35%
in 1954).
2
See David Moberg, Organize, Strategize, Revitalize; Unions Debate Best
Way to Revive Labor’s Fortunes, IN THESE TIMES, Feb. 16, 2004, at 18.
Proposals to revitalize unions include wide-scale organizing efforts,
restructuring unions so that there exists a smaller number of unions that are
focused on specific industries, and increasing internal union democracy. Id.
3
See Healthcare Ass’n of N.Y. State, Inc. v. Pataki (HANYS), 388 F. Supp.
2d 6, 9 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (“unions clearly view [New York’s “union neutrality”
statute] as sending a pro-union message”).
4
N.Y. LAB. LAW § 211-a (McKinney 1996) (amended 2002).
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211-a, which prohibits employers from using state funds to
discourage or encourage union organizing.5 With this law, labor
unions sought to enhance their position against the employers
through the law’s prohibition on state-supported employers’ use of
state funds to affect union membership—thus, employers would be
relegated to spending funds derived from profits or other sources
not provided by the state.6
While unions continue to push for the adoption of state union
neutrality laws, they presently face a risk that a court may find
such laws to be preempted by the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA).7 The Supreme Court has set forth two separate standards
for NLRA preemption: Garmon preemption and Machinist
preemption.8 The Garmon preemption prohibits states from
regulating conduct that is arguably protected or prohibited by the
NLRA.9 Alternatively, the Machinists preemption prevents state
interference in areas that Congress intended to leave to the free
play of economic forces.10 However, these strands of preemption
are subject to various exceptions.11 If a court finds that the state is
regulating matters covered by the NLRA under one of these two
doctrines, and the regulation is not saved by the exceptions, the
regulation is rendered invalid, often through the court’s dismissal
of a lawsuit.12
5

Id. The statute was later amended in 2002 to incorporate record keeping
and enforcement measures. See infra Part III.B.
6
See infra Part III.A.
7
See Jackson Lewis, Importance of Employer Speech at Heart of Second
Blow to California’s Union Neutrality Legislation, (Sept. 14, 2005),
http://www.jacksonlewis.com/legalupdates/articleprint.cfm?aid=846 (asserting
that the Ninth Circuit’s second opinion in Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v.
Lockyer, which held that California’s union neutrality law was preempted by the
NLRA, left little doubt that future state legislation seeking to impose employer
neutrality during union organizing campaigns will fail).
8
Stephen Befort & Brian Smith, At the Cutting Edge of Labor Law
Preemption: A Critique of Chamber of Commerce v. Lockyer, 20 LAB. LAW.
107 (Summer 2004).
9
Id. See infra Part II.B.1.
10
Befort & Smith, supra note 8, at 107. See infra Part II.B.2.
11
Befort & Smith, supra note 8, at 107.
12
4-36 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT: LAW & PRACTICE § 36.01

CHARISH MACROED CORRECTED 07-30-06.DOC

7/30/2006 12:35 PM

PREEMPTION OF NEW YORK LABOR LAW

781

This is precisely what occurred in the federal district court in
the Northern District of New York on May 17, 2005. In
Healthcare Association of New York State, Inc. v. Pataki,13
(hereinafter HANYS) the plaintiffs (a coalition of organizations
representing over 550 non-profit and public hospitals, nursing
homes, and health care agencies) argued that Section 211-a is
preempted by federal labor law, and is thus invalid.14 The court
agreed with the plaintiffs. In finding Section 211-a preempted by
federal labor law under the Machinist doctrine, Judge McCurn
concluded that the statute hindered an employer’s ability to
disseminate information to employees, which amounted to a direct
interference with the union organizing process recognized by
federal labor law.15 The case is currently being appealed in the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.16
This Note argues that New York Labor Law Section 211-a is
fully preempted by the NLRA under principles governed by the
Garmon preemption and the Machinist preemption, that no
exceptions to preemption apply, and that the decision of the district
court in HANYS should therefore be affirmed. Furthermore, should
HANYS not be affirmed, the impact on employers’ rights of free
speech would be irreparably chilled, which is not conducive to
(Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 2005).
13
388 F. Supp. 2d 6 (N.D.N.Y. 2005).
14
See infra Part III.C. Several groups also moved to appear as amicus
curiae, due to the vastly differing opinions between labor and management on
the effects of Section 211-a on labor relations in the workplace. HANYS, 388 F.
Supp. at 8. These groups were the Business Council, the Coalition, and the
Brennan Center. Id.
15
See infra Part III.C.
16
Oral arguments were heard before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
on February 10, 2006, and the court’s decision is now pending. In addition to the
appellants’ and appellees’ briefs submitted to the Court of Appeals, several
groups submitted amicus curiae briefs. On behalf of the plaintiffs-appellees,
amicus curiae briefs were submitted by the National Labor Relations Board,
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, New York State
Association of Health Care Providers, Inc., et. al., and National Right to Work
Legal Defense Foundation, Inc. On behalf of the defendants-appellants, amicus
curiae briefs were submitted by the Brennan Center for Justice, et. al. and
fourteen New York scholars on labor and employment law.
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advancing the goals of the collective bargaining process. Part I
briefly provides background information on union membership and
the methods which the unions are engaging to reverse the declining
membership trend. Part II explains the development of federal
labor law’s preemption of state labor legislation through the
Supreme Court’s development of case law addressing these issues.
Part III describes the provisions contained in Section 211-a and
Judge McCurn’s conclusion in HANYS that the federal labor law
preempts the statute. Part IV examines arguments on how the
Garmon and Machinist preemption standards, and their various
exceptions, should be applied to Section 211-a, and concludes that
federal labor law preempts the New York statute. Part V examines
the policy implications and impact that an affirmation of the
decision in HANYS will have in the sphere of labor management
relations.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF TACTICS TO BOLSTER UNION MEMBERSHIP
Since the years following World War II, union membership as
a percentage of the total workforce nationwide has been steadily
diminishing.17 When the American Federation of Labor-Congress
17

Frederick D. Braid, Laws Muzzle Employers, NAT’L L. J. (May 24,
2004),
available
at
http://www.hklaw.com/content//whitepapers/
lawsmuzzle.pdf. The decline in union membership has been attributed to
numerous economic and social factors. Stephen F. Befort, Labor and
Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review and Critical
Assessment, 43 B.C. L. Rev 351, 362 (March 2002). First, following WWII,
U.S. employment experienced a shift away from manufacturing and mining and
toward the service sector. See Press Release, Jeffrey Young, Voice of America,
The Challenge Facing U.S. Labor Unions (Sept. 4, 2005), available at
http://author.voanews.com/english/archive/2005-09/2005-08-02-voa17.cfm?
renderforprint=1&textonly=1&&CFI=6536443&CFTOKEN=42953398.
Whereas manufacturing and mining were typically union strongholds, the
service sector has historically contained a lower percentage of unionized
workers. Id. Second, the employment model has shifted from internal labor
markets characterized by long-term employment relationships toward unstable
employment relationships and an expanding contingent workforce. Befort,
supra, at 366-67. As a result, organizing has become increasingly difficult
because workers fail to see the benefits of union representation when their
employment is short-term. Id. at 370-71. Third, advances in technology,
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of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) was established in 1955,
the unions represented more than one-third of private-sector
employees.18 The most recent data on union membership reveals
that in 2005, 12.5% of workers were union members, with a mere
7.8% of private-sector employees belonging to a union.19
While the unions uniformly desire to bolster membership, they
have recently diverged in their approaches toward accomplishing
this common goal.20 This divergence in outlook led two of the
largest unions, the Service Employees International Union (SEIU)
and the Teamsters, to withdraw from the AFL-CIO21 on July 25,
2005, and form the Change to Win Coalition.22 The Change to Win
communication, and transportation have induced employers to engage in offshore production as a means of avoiding unions and simultaneously lowering
labor costs. Id. at 363-64. See also Patrick Mirza, et al., Ten Changes That
Rocked HR: It’s No Wonder HR is Expected to Help Manage Change. Look at
What it Has Been Through, SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
(Dec. 1, 2005), available at 2005 WLNR 22386727. Fourth, globalization has
forced employers to cut costs in order to effectively compete in the new
economy, resulting in employers more adamantly resisting unions’ wage
demands or engaging in union avoidance. See Befort, supra, at 364. See also
Mirza, supra. Fifth, commentators often note that the demographic identity of
the workforce has become dramatically more diverse. ROBERT J. RABIN, ET AL.,
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 234, (2nd ed. 1995). Id. See also Befort supra,
at 365 (providing the following demographic statistics: In 1950, the workforce
was composed of 33.9% adult women. By 2000, this percentage increased to
61.1%. Since 1950, the proportion of nonwhite employees has increased by
greater than 50%.). Lastly, some commentators and unions blame the decline of
unionization on unlawful employer coercion of employees during the union
election process, or alternatively on lawful but aggressive employer
campaigning. See infra Part V.
18
See Michael J. Stief III & Marijane E. Treacy, Labor Unions Throw Out
the Old Rulebook: The AFL-CIO’s Split Harbingers a New Era of Activism,
With Fresh Challenges for Employers, 28 NAT’L L. J. 9 (Oct. 31, 2005).
19
U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union Members in 2005 (Jan.
20, 2006), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf.
20
Voice of America, supra note 17.
21
The AFL-CIO “is a voluntary federation of 52 national and international
labor
unions.”
AFL-CIO,
This
is
the
AFL-CIO,
http://www.aflcio.org/aboutus/thisistheaflcio/.
22
America’s Labour Federation: Losing its Grip, ECONOMIST, July 30,
2005, at 72, available at 2005 WLNR 11967175.
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Coalition focuses on wide-scale organizing efforts at the workplace
as a means of rectifying decreasing union membership.23 In
contrast, the AFL-CIO focuses its efforts chiefly on politics, by
providing monetary funds to support political candidates that it
feels would be sympathetic towards labor, and by targeting specific
state laws.24
On the organizing front, one tactic that the unions have used
over the past several years to reverse the decline in union
membership is to shift their focus away from seeking secret ballot
elections.25 Secret ballot elections are held by the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) upon the filing of a petition to determine
whether a majority of the employees desire union representation.26
Between the filing of the petition and the holding of the election,
the union and the employer mount campaigns to inform employees
of their views on unionization.27 Since these employer
communications to employees during the campaigns frustrate
unions’ organizing efforts, unions have targeted their efforts on
obtaining card check agreements, particularly in those industries
that cannot relocate, including municipalities, universities, and
healthcare complexes such as hospitals and nursing homes.28 A
23

Voice of America, supra note 17.
Id. The AFL-CIO targets legislation involving the minimum wage and
safety measures in the workplace, as well as seeking to prevent the spread of
Right to Work laws to states in which this legislation is not currently enacted. Id.
A Right to Work Law is “a state law that prevents labor-management
agreements requiring a person to join a union as a condition of employment.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 615 (2nd Pocket ed. 2001). Recently, the AFL-CIO
has encouraged the enactment of union neutrality laws by states, including New
York Labor Law Section 211-a. See infra Part III.A.
25
Braid, supra note 17.
26
Peter M. Panken, Union Organizing and NLRB Representation Cases: A
Management Perspective, SK083 ALI-ABA 421, 427 (2005). For a
comprehensive discussion of the procedures for a secret ballot election, see id. at
427-31.
27
Id. at 428-29. Unions usually want the time between the filing of the
petition and the holding of the election to be minimized, so that the employer
has less time to communicate the disadvantages of a union to its employees. Id.
at 429.
28
Norman Poltenson, Judge Throws Out ‘Labor Neutrality Law’, 19 BUS. J
- CENT. N.Y. 1 (May 20, 2005).
24
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card-check eliminates the need for organizing campaigns and
secret ballots by merely requiring that the union present the
employer with union authorization cards signed by a majority of
the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit in order for the
union to be recognized.29 Organized labor lobbied to amend federal
labor law to permit card checks to serve as a substitute for secret
ballot elections in determining a union’s majority status.30 Though
unsuccessful, its movement to formalize permissible voluntary
recognition through advance card check agreements with
employers has seen greater success.31
An alternative method employed by unions is to obtain
neutrality agreements from employers through private bargaining
efforts.32 Neutrality agreements generally require that an employer
maintain a neutral position during a union’s campaign to organize
the employer’s workforce.33 Under a typical neutrality agreement,
the employer will voluntarily recognize the union upon a showing
of authorization cards signed by the majority of its employees.34
Additional provisions may also be found in neutrality agreements,
such as a “gag order” on employer communication to employees
about its views on unionization and permitting the union to access
the employer’s facilities to distribute pro-union literature.35 While
29

Id.
Braid, supra note 17.
31
Id. According to data provided by the AFL-CIO, in 2004 between
150,000 and 200,000 employees were organized through card-check
agreements, while only 70,000 employees were organized through traditional
NLRB secret ballot election processes. See Stief & Treacy, supra note 18.
32
See Roger C. Hartley, Non-Legislative Labor Law Reform and PreRecognition Labor Neutrality Agreements: The Newest Civil Rights Movement,
22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 369, 372 (2001) (“[a] central component of the
unions’ transformed organizing strategy is greater reliance on the prerecognition neutrality agreement negotiated with an employer whose employees
a union is attempting to organize”).
33
Joseph A. Barker, Keeping Neutrality Agreements Neutral, 84 MICH B.J.
33, 36 (Aug. 2005).
34
See generally George N. Davies, Neutrality Agreements: Basic
Principles of Enforcement and Available Remedies, 16 LAB. LAW. 215 (Fall
2000) (describing provisions contained in neutrality agreements).
35
See Charles I. Cohen, Neutrality Agreements: Will the NLRB Sanction its
30
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these agreements may seem counterintuitive to employers’
interests, employers may be willing to compromise their right to
oppose union organizing efforts for various reasons, such as to take
advantage of business opportunities that may be available solely to
employers of union members.36
Major national unions consider the attainment of neutrality
agreements to be an important contemporary mechanism for
reversing the declining influence of unions in the private
workforce,37 and the AFL-CIO has promoted this contractual
approach for shifting the context in which organizing occurs.38 The
neutrality agreements are advantageous to unions in that they assist
them in their efforts to increase membership by bypassing the
NLRB’s time-consuming, expensive, and ultimately unpredictable
process.39 However, there are various obstacles to the unions’
attainment of neutrality agreements. One such obstacle is that some
employees have filed complaints with the NLRB against unions
seeking to overthrow card check and neutrality agreements and
impose the traditional secret ballot election, because the employees
believe the agreements are attempts to coerce them to join unions

Own Obsolescence? 16 LAB. LAW. 201, 203 (Fall 2000) (describing numerous
provisions in neutrality agreement beyond the maintenance of campaign
neutrality).
36
See Barker, supra note 33, at 34 (describing multiple reasons for why
employers may agree to negotiate union neutrality agreements).
37
Cohen, supra note 35 at 202 (noting that numerous national unions in a
variety of industries have successfully secured neutrality agreements with
employers).
38
Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill Kriesky, Union Organizing Under Neutrality
and Card Check Agreements, 55 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 42 (Oct. 2001).
39
Cohen, supra note 35, at 202. See also Barker, supra note 33, at 34
(noting that the unions may seek neutrality agreements to circumvent the delay
and uncertainty inherent in the secret ballot election process). While the unions
win about 50% of secret ballot elections conducted by the NLRB, they win
almost 90% of the cases where a card check or neutrality agreement is
employed. Id. See also BRADLEY W. KAMPAS & SCOTT OBORNE, NINTH CIRCUIT
STRIKES DOWN CALIFORNIA’S UNION-NEUTRALITY LEGISLATION, 2004-7
BENDER’S LABOR & EMP. BULL. 1 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 2004) (noting
that a 1999 AFL-CIO study determined that unions win 84% of elections when
employers are bound by one-sided neutrality clauses).
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against their will.40 A significant barrier to the unionizing
technique is employer opposition because neutrality agreements
require an employer’s authorization.41 Unsurprisingly, organized
labor considers the removal of employer opposition to be of the
highest priority.42
Due to the limitations of negotiated union neutrality
agreements, unions have recently turned their efforts toward
fervently lobbying for legislation that encourages or mandates
employer neutrality at the state and local levels.43 Unions seeking
to organize new members have particularly targeted nonprofit
employers whose source of funding is primarily derived from the
state government in their push for legislation preventing employers
who receive state money from using such funds to discourage
unionization.44 This legislation starkly differs from privately
negotiated neutrality agreements. In private neutrality agreements,
employers expressly and voluntarily agree to waive their right to
communicate with employees through provisions negotiated with
the union.45 The neutrality agreement formulated as a result of
private bargaining between the employer and union often contains
express provisions that allow the employer to respond to employee
questions or to misrepresentations by the union.46 In contrast, state
40

See Barbara Wieland, Neutrality Pacts Hit Nerve for Workers, LANSING
STATE JOURNAL, May 16, 2004, at 1D (explaining how employees at Dana
Corp.’s plant filed complaints with the NLRB against the United Auto Workers
union).
41
Cohen, supra note 35, at 201. The agreements may also be subject to
unfair labor practices. See Barker, supra note 33, at 34 (describing possible legal
challenges to union neutrality laws). See also Davies, supra note 34 (providing a
comprehensive analysis of the legal and practical issues arising from the
negotiation and implementation of neutrality agreements).
42
Lewis, supra note 7.
43
Id.
44
See Nicholas D’Ambrosio, New York’s Labor Neutrality Law Struck
Down by Court, THE BUSINESS REVIEW, June 10, 2005, available at
http://www.bizjournals.com/albany/stories/2005/06/13/smallb2.html.
45
Cohen, supra note 35, at 207. The NLRA protects employers’ free
speech rights. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c). See infra Part IV.A.1.
46
Appellees’ Brief in Opposition at n.15, HANYS, No. 05-2570 (2d Cir.
argued Feb. 10, 2006).
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imposed union neutrality laws compel limitations on employer
communications about unions regardless of their willingness to
have the expression of their views restricted.47
There have been many recent proposals for legislation
prohibiting employers who receive state government funding from
spending those funds to advocate for or against unionization.48
Although many of these proposals were vetoed or died in
committee,49 the New York State legislature enacted Labor Law
Section 211-a in 1996, which commands that employers shall not
use state funds for certain specified acts to discourage or encourage
union organizing.50 Employers, unions, and the State all have
differing views on the statute. Employers facing union
organization campaigns have bitterly nicknamed Section 211-a the
“employers’ gag law” and view the law as a measure to defeat
employer opposition to union organization.51 Conversely, New
York State’s position, as articulated by Governor Pataki, is that
Section 211-a is a “union neutrality law” which seeks to ensure
that taxpayers’ money is used for its intended purpose.52 Unions
favor the law for its allegedly pro-union effect of providing
protection for workers seeking to organize unions.53 Rather than
47

Id. (noting that state union neutrality laws impose a “one size fits all”
neutrality policy on employers).
48
California’s “union neutrality” law is codified as Cal. Govt. Code §§
16645-49. Similar statutes are, or have been, under consideration in a number of
states. For a listing of proposed union neutrality statutes and their outcomes in
various state legislatures see John Logan, Innovations in State and Local Labor
Legislation, in 3 THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA LABOR 181, 196-98
(Institute for Labor and Employment ed., University of California Press 2003).
Additionally, a number of local government entities, such as Milwaukee County,
have passed similar regulations. See Metropolitan Milwaukee Ass’n of
Commerce v. Milwaukee County, 359 F. Supp. 2d 749 (E.D. Wis. 2005)
(holding that Milwaukee’s union neutrality law which applies to contractors is
not preempted by the NLRA).
49
See Logan, supra note 48, at 196-98.
50
N.Y. LAB. LAW § 211-a (McKinney 1996) (amended 2002).
51
Poltenson, supra note 28, at 1.
52
HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 9.
53
Id. (noting that the President of New York State’s AFL-CIO declared
that Section 211-a “ensures that taxpayer dollars will not be used to interfere
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seeking to obtain neutrality agreements with individual employers,
today many unions have refocused their efforts by pushing for the
adoption of state and local legislation encouraging or mandating
employer neutrality.54 While the unions’ efforts have been met
with success in a few state legislatures, these union neutrality laws
are beginning to be tested in the courts and because they impose
limitations on the employers’ free speech, a zone protected by
Congress, they may be found to be preempted.
II. THE NLRA AND THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
Labor-management relations policy in the United States is
governed by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).55 The
preemption doctrine establishes that the NLRA has primacy over
all competing state efforts to regulate labor relations, in order to
ensure the uniformity of labor policy throughout the United
States.56 The Supreme Court has established two theories of NLRA
preemption over state laws: the Garmon preemption and the
Machinists preemption.57 Significantly, however, any finding of
preemption requires that the state is engaging in conduct that
constitutes regulation of the overall labor market.58 The NLRA
therefore does not preempt state conduct when it acts as a
proprietor or market participant.59 When a state act institutes labor
conditions on parties in the same manner as a private contractor,
then the state is merely participating in the market in its own selfinterest, and consequently the market participant exception will
apply.60

with a worker’s constitutional right to join a union”)
54
KAMPAS & OBORNE, supra note 39.
55
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT: LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 12.
56
Id.
57
Befort & Smith, supra note 8, at 107.
58
Id. at 115 (noting that the preemption doctrine will not be implicated
where the state engages in conduct that directly effects the parties in a labor
dispute but does not constitute regulation).
59
51 C.J.S. LABOR RELATIONS § 42.
60
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT: LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 12.
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A. Brief History of the NLRA

In 1935, Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA)61 to provide uniform federal regulation of the
workplace.62 The NLRA continues to be the foundation for labor
law in the United States.63 The NLRA sets forth the various rules
and values governing private sector labor management relations,64
including the right of workers to organize and bargain
collectively.65 In its original form, the NLRA was biased in favor
of organized labor, in that it solely protected employees from
abuses by their employers.66 However, it was later modified with
the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 and the LandrumGriffin Act in 1959, which set forth prohibitions on certain union
conduct,67 providing for a more neutral policy towards employers
and unions.
B. Basis of Preemption of State Law by the NLRA
In examining the many provisions contained in the NLRA, one
will not find any explicit declaration of the Act’s preemptive
effect.68 Since Congress has remained silent on the issue of
preemption, the preemptive effect of the NLRA is, to a large
extent, a judicially-created doctrine.69 The Supreme Court in
particular has expanded the Act’s preemptive effects through its
invalidation of numerous state efforts to regulate labor relations.70
The courts have reasoned that the NLRA was created because the
61

29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69.
1-1 LABOR & EMP. LAW § 1.01 (Matthew & Bender & Co., Inc. 2005).
63
RABIN, supra note 17, at 15.
64
Id.
65
29 U.S.C. § 151.
66
LABOR & EMP. LAW § 1.01, supra note 62.
67
See id. (explaining the changes to the NLRA imposed by the TaftHartley and Landrum-Griffin Acts).
68
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT: LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 12 at
n.2.
69
Id. at 1.
70
Id.
62
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states were unable to achieve stable labor relations on their own.71
With a firm belief that the preemption doctrine seeks to ensure
uniform standards for labor policy throughout the United States,
the courts have consistently held that the NLRA trumps state
efforts to regulate labor relations.72 More specifically, in 2003 the
Second Circuit recognized the principle that the Supremacy Clause
of the United States Constitution ensures that federal law has
priority over state law whenever there is conflict among them, and
that the NLRA’s preemptive effect derives from Congress’
“unambiguous intent” in enacting the NLRA to limit state
regulation of activity related to labor-management relations.73 Two
separate forms of NLRA preemption have emerged that address
state laws that improperly regulate labor relations—Garmon
preemption and Machinist preemption.74
1. Garmon Preemption
The Garmon doctrine prohibits state regulation of activities
that are arguably protected by section 7 of the NLRA, and forbids
state regulation of conduct arguably constituting an unfair labor
practice under section 8.75 Hence, the NLRA preempts not merely
state regulation that actually conflicts with the NLRA’s provisions,
but also state regulation of conduct that is arguably protected or
71

Id.
Id.
73
Rondout Elec., Inc. v. N.Y. State Dept. of Labor, 335 F.3d 162, 166 (2d
Cir. 2003).
74
See Robert Rachal, Machinists Preemption Under the NLRA: A Powerful
Tool to Protect an Employer’s Freedom to Bargain, 58 LA. L. REV. 1065, 1066
(Summer 1998).
75
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of the Metro. Dist. v. Associated
Builders & Contractors of Mass./R.I., Inc., (Boston Harbor) 507 U.S. 218, 224
(1993) (citing San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244
(U.S. 1959)). Section 7 of the NLRA protects employees’ right to form or join a
union, collectively bargain, and “engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” 29 U.S.C. §
157. Section 8 of the NLRA prohibits employers and unions from committing
unfair labor practices, including interference with employees’ section 7 rights.
29 U.S.C. § 158.
72
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prohibited by the NLRA.76 The Garmon preemption was set forth
in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,77 in which the
Supreme Court concluded that a state court could not award
damages to an employer resulting from peaceful picketing by
unions, because the picketing was arguably protected by section 7
of the NLRA, or arguably constituted an unfair labor practice
under section 8.78 In this case, the unions, none of which were
selected by a majority of employees as their collective bargaining
agent, engaged in peaceful picketing, which resulted in economic
injuries to the employers.79 The California state court awarded
damages to the employers.80 However, on appeal, the Supreme
Court held that the state court was precluded from awarding the
employers damages because the picketing activity was potentially
regulated by federal law; the picketing was arguably protected by
section 7 of the NLRA or arguably constituted an unfair labor
practice under section 8.81 Thus evolved what is termed the
Garmon preemption doctrine, by which issues legislated in the
NLRA may not be regulated by legislation of the individual states.
The Garmon preemption doctrine exists to prevent states from
regulating activities that may conflict with national labor policy.82
It is based upon the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, by which the
issue of whether the NLRA protects or prohibits state conduct is
determined by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) as
opposed to being resolved by the state courts.83
The Supreme Court has established two exceptions to the

76
77
78

Befort & Smith, supra note 8, at 110.
359 U.S. 236 (1959).
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (U.S.

1959).
79

BRUCE HARRISON & RANDI KLEIN HYATT, PROJECT LABOR
AGREEMENTS AND THE GOVERNMENT: HAS THE MARKET PARTICIPATION
EXCEPTION COME TO SWALLOW THE FEDERAL PREEMPTION RULE?, 5-2
BENDER’S LABOR & EMP. BULL. 2 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 2005).
80
Garmon, 359 U.S. at 237-38.
81
Id. at 244.
82
Id. at 246.
83
2-36 LABOR AND EMP. LAW § 36.05 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 2005).
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Garmon preemption.84 First, under what is referred to as the
“peripheral concern exception,” state regulations will not be
preempted where the activity regulated is a mere peripheral
concern of federal labor law.85 In determining whether this
exception is applicable, the courts focus on the likelihood that the
state will regulate conduct that the NLRA protects or prohibits.86
Second, under the local interest exception, state regulation will not
be preempted where the feelings of strong local interests are
involved.87 Typically, the courts have found this exception to apply
where the state regulation is rooted in violence, threats,
intimidation, and obstruction of property.88 The Court has
expanded the local interest exception to apply to defamation
actions based on claims of malicious libel,89 and to a state claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress.90 However, not all
state tort claims raise significant enough state concerns to avoid
preemption by federal labor law; business torts, for example, are
generally found to fall outside of the local interest exception.91
While these two open-ended exceptions to the Garmon doctrine
could have broad applications, they have been interpreted narrowly
by the courts.92

84

Garmon, 359 U.S. at 243-44.
Id.
86
LABOR AND EMP. LAW § 36.05, supra note 83 (citing Belknap, Inc. v.
Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983)).
87
Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244.
88
LABOR AND EMP. LAW § 36.05, supra note 83. See e.g. United Constr.
Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954) (holding that federal
labor law did not preempt an employer’s state law claim in the nature of a tort
action for damages arising from a union’s threats of violence, even though the
threats arguably constituted an unfair labor practice under the NLRA).
89
LABOR AND EMP. LAW § 36.05, supra note 83 (citing Linn v. Plant Guard
Workers Union, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966)).
90
LABOR AND EMP. LAW § 36.05, supra note 83 (citing Farmer v. United
Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977) (holding that
claims regarding discrimination were preempted, but the state outrageous
conduct claim was not preempted)).
91
LABOR AND EMP. LAW § 36.05, supra note 83.
92
Id.
85
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2. Machinist Preemption

The Machinist doctrine prevents states from interfering with
the use of economic weapons by parties to a labor-management
dispute during the course of collective bargaining, even if the
NLRA does not explicitly protect the use of those weapons.93 In
Lodge 76, International Association of Machinists v. Wisconsin
Employee Relations Commission,94 the Supreme Court set forth the
Machinist preemption by holding that the NLRA preempts the
authority of a state labor board to enjoin a union from refusing to
work overtime because it is an economic self-help activity that
Congress intended to leave unregulated.95 In this case, the union
members refused to work overtime during negotiations for the
renewal of an expired collective bargaining agreement with the
employer.96 The employer filed a complaint with the NLRB,
asserting that this refusal constituted an unfair labor practice under
the NLRA.97 The NLRB determined that the refusal did not violate
the NLRA, and therefore dismissed the charge.98 The employer
also filed an unfair labor practice complaint with the Wisconsin
Employees Relations Commission.99 This state labor board
determined that the refusal constituted an unfair labor practice
under state law, and consequently ordered the union to desist from
its refusal to work overtime.100 The Wisconsin state court affirmed
the state labor board order.101 However, on appeal the Supreme
Court reversed the lower court’s affirmation because the union’s
concerted refusal to work overtime was peaceful conduct and
Congress did not intend for the states to regulate such peaceful
self-help activity.102 Thus evolved what is termed the Machinist
93

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT: LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 12.
427 U.S. 132 (1976).
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
HARRISON & HYATT, supra note 79.
94
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preemption doctrine, by which issues not expressly legislated in
the NLRA, but which are deemed contrary to the spirit of national
labor policy, may not be regulated by legislation of the individual
states.
The Machinist doctrine recognizes that Congress intended for
some activities to be left unregulated and to be controlled instead
by the free play of economic forces,103 in contrast to the Garmon
doctrine which seeks to preserve the NLRB’s primary jurisdiction
by rendering invalid state conduct that the NLRA arguably protects
or prohibits.104 The Machinist preemption affects attempts by the
state to restrict the economic self-help weapons that may be
utilized by the employer or union during a labor dispute, such as
strikes, lockouts, or slowdowns.105 Employers as well as unions
have the right to use economic weapons where more peaceful
measures are unavailing.106 State regulation of conduct essential to
an economic conflict between labor and management conflicts
with protections rooted in national labor policy and is preempted
under the Machinist doctrine, even though federal labor law does
not expressly protect the conduct.107
3. Market Participant Exception to Garmon and Machinist
Preemption
In Building and Construction Trades Council of the
Metropolitan District v. Associated Builders & Contractors of
Massachusetts/Rhode Island, Inc. (“Boston Harbor”), the Supreme
Court created an exception to the Garmon and Machinist
preemption doctrines, commonly known as the market participant
exception, which permits states to act in a proprietary capacity.108
103

Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aero. Workers v. Wis. Employment
Relations Comm’n (Machinists), 427 U.S. 132, 144 (U.S. 1976).
104
LABOR AND EMP. LAW § 36.05, supra note 83.
105
HARRISON & HYATT, supra note 79.
106
Robert Rachal, Machinists Preemption Under the NLRA: A Powerful
Tool to Protect an Employer’s Freedom to Bargain, 58 LA. L. REV. 1065, 1068
(Summer 1998).
107
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT: LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 12.
108
Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. at 227. See Logan, supra note 48, at 115.
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In Boston Harbor, the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority
(MWRA), a state agency providing sewage services, hired Kaiser
Engineers as its project manager for a project to clean up the
pollution in Boston Harbor.109 Kaiser negotiated a labor agreement
with Building and Construction Trades Counsel, and MWRA
mandated that Bid Specification 13.1 be incorporated into its
solicitation of bids for work on the project.110 Bid Specification
13.1 stipulated that each successful bidder must agree to abide by
the labor agreement’s provisions.111 The Court of Appeals
concluded that Bid Specification 13.1 was preempted by the
NLRA under both the Garmon and the Machinist preemption.112
However, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the NLRA
does not preempt a valid pre-hire labor agreement negotiated by
private parties where the state authority acted as an owner of a
construction project.113 The Court distinguished between the state
government acting as a regulator and as a proprietor.114 The Court
articulated that NLRA preemption solely applies to state regulation
of labor and not to a state’s interactions with private organizations
in the marketplace.115
While circuit courts diverge in their application of the market
participant exception,116 the Second Circuit during its market
participant analysis cited with approval the test applied by the Fifth
Circuit in Cardinal Towing.117 This test involves a two-part
109

Id. at 220-21.
Id. at 221-22.
111
Id. at 222 (specifically, Bid Specification 13.1 provided that “each
successful bidder and any and all levels of subcontractors, as a condition of
being awarded a contract or subcontract, will agree to abide by the provisions of
the . . . [labor agreement] . . . and will be bound by the provisions of that
agreement in the same manner as any provision of the contract”).
112
Id. at 223-24.
113
Id. at 218-19.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 15.
117
180 F.3d 686 (5th Cir. 1999); HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 7 (citing
Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Mills, 283 F.3d 404, 420 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that
the Telecommunications Act did not preempt school officials from seeking
enforcement of the provisions of their lease because the school officials acted in
110
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analysis:
First, does the challenged action essentially reflect the
entity’s own interest in its efficient procurement of needed
goods and services, as measured by comparison with the
typical behavior of private parties in similar circumstances?
Second, does the narrow scope of the challenged action
defeat an inference that its primary goal was to encourage a
general policy rather than address a specific proprietary

a proprietary capacity). The Federal District Court for the Northern District of
New York in NextG Networks of N.Y. v. City of N.Y. also specifically articulated
the Cardinal Towing test in its analysis of whether the City’s actions were
proprietary or regulatory. NextG Networks of N.Y., Inc. v. City of New York,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25063 at *17 (N.D.N.Y. 2004). A second test, the Sage
Hospitality test, derived from Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees
Union, Local 57 v. Sage Hospitality Resources, LLC, emerged in the Third
Circuit for deciding whether the market participant exception applies. Hotel
Employees & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 57 v. Sage Hospitality
Resources, LLC, 390 F.3d 206 (3rd Cir. 2004). The Sage Hospitality test
employs a two-part analysis for which the second factor is substantially similar
to Cardinal Towing, but the first factor does not suggest that the state has to
prove that its action is typical of the actions of private entities. HANYS, 388 F.
Supp. 2d at 15. The district court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin in
Metropolitan Milwaukee Association of Commerce v. Milwaukee County
(MMAC) employed the Sage Hospitality test, but was reversed by the Seventh
Circuit, which engaged in an analysis consistent with Cardinal Towing. Metro.
Milwaukee Ass’n of Commerce v. Milwaukee County, 431 F.3d 277, 282 (7th
Cir. 2005) (“[I]f the state is intervening in the labor relations just of firms from
which it buys services, and it is doing so in order to reduce the cost or increase
the quality of those services rather than to displace the authority of the National
Labor Relations Act and the National Labor Relations Board, there is no
preemption.”); See Reply Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 15, HANYS, No.
05-2750 (2d Cir. argued Feb. 10, 2006). In HANYS, the district court chose to
apply the Cardinal Towing standard, but did not require the state to prove that
its conduct is “typical of similarly situated private entities” because it agreed
with the district court’s reasoning in MMAC that states often act in areas that
private parties do not. HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 17. Since the district court’s
decision in MMAC has been reversed, and both parties concede that Cardinal
Towing is the appropriate test to apply in the Second Circuit, this Note asserts
that Section 211-a is subject to the Cardinal Towing test in determining whether
the market participant exception saves it from NLRA preemption. See Reply
Brief for Defendants-Appellants, supra, at 15.
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problem? 118
The first prong looks at the nature of the expenditure and
protects comprehensive state policies with broad application from
preemption, as long as the state is acting in a proprietary manner,
119
which involves acting like a private entity with regard to the
purchase of goods and services for its own use.120 The second
prong looks at the scope of the expenditure and protects from
preemption narrow spending decisions that do not have the effect
of broader social regulation.121
A point of contention currently exists on whether Section 211-a
passes these two criteria, thereby saving it from preemption
analysis. While the district court for the Northern District of New
York has articulated the inapplicability of the market participant
exception to the legislation, in accordance with a modified
Cardinal Towing test,122 this issue is currently being considered by
the Second Circuit.123
III. NEW YORK’S UNION NEUTRALITY STATUTE
In the wake of recent pressure by labor organizations on state
legislatures to pass union

118

Cardinal Towing & Auto Repair, Inc. v. City of Bedford, Tex., 180 F.3d
686, 693 (5th Cir. 1999).
119
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT: LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 12,
quoting Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Lockyer (Lockyer I), 364
F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004).
120
JAMES E. BODDY, JR., PREEMPTED OR NOT PREEMPTED - A RECENT
DECISION ADDRESSES LABOR PEACE AGREEMENTS FOR GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTORS, 5-6 BENDER’S LABOR & EMP. BULL. 1 (Matthew Bender & Co.,
Inc. 2005).
121
Id.
122
See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
123
Similarly, a federal district court and the Ninth Circuit in a three judge
panel in Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Lockyer declared that the
California union neutrality statute was not saved from preemption by the market
participant exception. 364 F.3d at 1159. A rehearing en banc was later granted
and the Ninth Circuit’s holding was recently withdrawn by the en banc court.
See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
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neutrality statutes,124 New York State enacted its own version
in 1996 through Section 211-a of the New York Labor Law.125 The
law in its original form underwent various revisions in 2002, which
consequently broadened its scope as well as set forth reporting and
enforcement measures.126 Approximately nine years after the law’s
original enactment, the federal district court for the Northern
District of New York ruled that the law is preempted by the
NLRA.127
A. The Legislative History and the Original 1996 Version of
New York’s Union Neutrality Law
In 1996, a Bill was introduced to the New York State Senate
seeking to amend the New York Labor Law. The Bill’s designated
purpose was to prevent state funds from being used to train
managers and supervisors in methods to unfairly influence labor
relations.128 The justification for the Bill was an awareness of
various instances in which state funds were being used by
employers to finance anti-unionization seminars, and the desire to
prohibit state funds from being utilized to finance activities
contrary to the right of employees to organize and to engage in
collective bargaining.129 The Bill specifically noted one instance in
which the Office of Aging sponsored a seminar where a labor
attorney from an anti-union firm performed a work-shop on
methods to avoid unionization in the nursing home industry.130
Local 1199 of the Service Employees International Union, a
politically powerful New York City-based health care union and
the largest union representing healthcare employees in New York
State, and the AFL-CIO heavily lobbied for the Bill.131 Various
124

See supra Part I.
N.Y. LAB. LAW § 211-a (McKinney 1996) (amended 2002).
126
N.Y. LAB. LAW § 211-a (McKinney 2002).
127
HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d 6 (N.D.N.Y. 2005).
128
Assemb. 8058, 219th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1996).
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Tamara Loomis, Statute Limiting Anti-Union Activity Takes Effect Dec.
29, 228 N.Y. L.J. 1 (Dec. 12, 2002).
125
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unions, including the New York State chapter of the AFL-CIO,
New York State United Teachers, the Civil Service Employees
Association, and the Public Employees Federation also wrote
letters to Governor Pataki urging him to support the Bill.132 These
unions emphasized their belief that the Bill, if enacted, would
protect the rights of New York employees to organize for
collective bargaining by prohibiting the use of state funds in antiunion efforts.133 Opponents of the Bill asserted that it was
unnecessary because there had been very few instances in which
state funds were used to discourage unionization.134
Despite opposition from employers, on August 8, 1996, New
York enacted the Bill in Labor Law Section 211-a, which went into
effect on October 7, 1996.135 Initially, the law prohibited
employers from using state funds for the purpose of training
supervisory or managerial employees in methods of discouraging
union organization.136 The law in its original form, therefore, was
solely targeted at employers who actively discouraged unionization
as part of employee training.137 Additionally, the original law did
not include provisions for enforcement or penalties for
violations.138 New York unions complained that due to the lack of
such provisions, employers were able to evade the law simply by
asserting that they were spending state funds to teach managers
about compliance with the NLRA.139 In order to remedy the
perceived flaws in Section 211-a, major labor organizations
fervently lobbied for amendments to the law.140 These labor
132

Assemb. 8058, 219th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1996).
Id.
134
Id.
135
N.Y. LAB. LAW § 211-a (McKinney 1996) (amended 2002).
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Logan, supra note 48, at 181 n.67. The original law merely provided:
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no monies appropriated by the
state for any purpose shall be used or made available to employers to train
managers, supervisors, or other administrative personnel regarding methods to
discourage union organization.” N.Y. LAB. LAW § 211-a (McKinney 1996).
139
Logan, supra note 48, at 181 n.67.
140
Charles H. Kaplan, et al., N.Y. Employers Face New Laws on Smoking,
133
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organizations urged the State to adopt stricter, more effective
measures that would prohibit all employers receiving state funding,
including private healthcare organizations that accept Medicaid
reimbursements and other funds for treatment and services
provided to their patients, from using these funds to encourage or
discourage union activities.141
B. New York’s 2002 Amended Union Neutrality Law
Governor Pataki signed into effect amendments to Section 211a on December 29, 2002.142 These amendments greatly broadened
the scope of the union neutrality law in a number of ways.143 First,
as amended, Section 211-a prohibits employers from using state
funds not only to discourage union organization, but also to
encourage such activity.144 The legislature expressly declared in
the Section its justification for the law:
[W]hen public funds are appropriated for the purchase of
specific goods and/or the provision of needed services, and
those funds are instead used to encourage or discourage
union organization, the proprietary interests of the state are
adversely affected. As a result, the legislature declares that
the use of state funds and property to encourage or
discourage employees from union organization constitutes
a misuse of the public funds and a misapplication of scarce
resources, which should be utilized solely for the public
purpose for which they were appropriated.145
The scope of the law reaches any employer who does business
with New York State, including healthcare, social services,
Discrimination, Organizing, Layoffs, LAB. & EMP. DEP’T. (Thelen Reid &
Priest), May 12, 2003, at 3, http://www.constructionweblinks.com/
Resources/Industry_Reports__Newsletters/May_12_2003/NY_employment_law
s.htm.
141
John Caher, Judge Strikes Barring Discussion of Union Activity, N.Y.
L.J. (May 20, 2005).
142
N.Y. LAB. LAW § 211-a (McKinney 2002).
143
Id.
144
Id. at § 211-a(2).
145
Id. at § 211-a(1).
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universities, and other not-for-profit organizations that generally
receive the most state money and are largely dependent upon state
funding such as Medicare or Medicaid payments.146
Second, the amendments expand the coverage of the statute by
specifying prohibited activities, including the training of managers,
the hiring or paying of attorneys or consultants, or the hiring or
compensating of employees to either encourage or discourage
union organization.147 The law requires detailed accounting and
financial reporting requirements.148 Employers who receive state
funds and engage in activities to encourage or discourage union
organization must maintain valid and accurate financial records
that sufficiently demonstrate that state funds were not used to pay
for such activities.149 The state agency providing the funds to the
employer and the New York State Attorney General could request
to review these financial records at any time, and the employer is
obligated to provide the records within ten business days of this
request.150 Moreover, the statute grants the New York State
Attorney General specific enforcement powers in the form of
seeking orders to enjoin the commission of a violation of the
law.151 A court may order the return of any misspent funds to the
State and the imposition of civil penalties up to one thousand
dollars.152 Additionally, courts have the authority to impose
penalties greater than the amount unlawfully expended where the
employer knowingly violated the statute or engaged in a previous
violation within the preceding two years.153
Lastly, the 2002 version of Section 211-a contains a provision
authorizing the New York State Labor Commissioner to formulate
146

Kaplan, supra note 140. See also Braid, supra note 17. The plaintiffs in
HANYS alleged that they and their member providers receive between 80 and
100% of their revenue from government sources. See Complaint, HANYS ¶¶ 1721.
147
N.Y. LAB. LAW § 211-a(2).
148
HANYS, 388 F. Supp 2d at 9.
149
N.Y. LAB. LAW § 211-a(3).
150
Id.
151
Id. at § 211-a(4).
152
Id.
153
Id.
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regulations that describe both the form and content of the required
financial records, and to render guidance to state entities as to the
enforcement of the law through the development of contractual and
administrative measures.154
C. Healthcare Association of New York State, Inc. v. Pataki
Ruled that Section 211-a is Preempted.
On October 30, 2002, Margery E. Lieber, Assistant General
Counsel for Special Litigation for the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB), wrote to Linda Angello, New York State Labor
Commissioner, expressing the NLRB’s concerns that Section 211a may be preempted by the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA).155 On January 30, 2003, officials from the New York
State Attorney General’s Labor Bureau and the State’s Department
of Labor sent a response to the NLRB156 defending the validity of
Section 211-a as a legally permissible choice by the State not to
fund certain activities.157 During this time, a group of healthcare
and social service associations in New York wrote a letter to
NLRB General Counsel Arthur Rosenfeld and the Special
Litigation Branch, seeking an injunction to prevent the
enforcement of Section 211-a, or alternatively, seeking to intervene
in actions that the NLRB intended to bring in federal court.158 The
NLRB did not respond to the request.159
On April 3, 2003, a coalition of healthcare organizations
representing over 550 non-profit and public hospitals, nursing

154

Id. at § 211-a(5). These regulations had not yet been promulgated when
the decision of the federal district court in HANYS that Section 211-a was
preempted by the NLRA was rendered. Memorandum of Law in Support of
Motion to Dismiss at 18, HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d 6 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 03
Civ. 0413), available at 2003 WL 24152872.
155
Herbert G. Birch, Inc., N.L.R.B. no. 29-RC-10227 (July 15, 2004),
available at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/legal/decisions/.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Id.
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homes, and residential healthcare facilities160 filed a lawsuit in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of New York
against the Governor, the Attorney General, and the Commissioner
of Labor for the State of New York.161 The plaintiffs alleged that
Section 211-a is preempted by the NLRA and is unconstitutional
because it violates their free speech rights under the First
Amendment and due process rights under the 14th Amendment.162
District Judge McCurn ruled that Section 211-a is preempted by
the NLRA under the Machinist doctrine and granted the plaintiffs
summary judgment.163 He concluded that the Section hindered an
160

Logan, supra note 48, at 182. See also HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 8.
Specifically, plaintiffs were Healthcare Association of New York State, New
York Association of Homes and Services for the Aging, New York State Health
Facilities Association Inc., NYSARC Inc. and United Cerebral Palsy
Associations of New York State. HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 6. These five
health-care organizations have members or affiliates that provide a broad range
of health-care services. The Healthcare Association of New York State was the
lead plaintiff, which is an organization representing 550 New York State nonprofit and public health-care organizations, including hospitals, nursing homes,
and home-care agencies. Poltenson, supra note 28, at 1. The Chamber of
Commerce of the United States of America, HR Policy Association, and the
Business Council of New York State, Inc. filed an amici curiae brief in support
of Plaintiffs. See Brief of Amici Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., et.
al., HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d 6 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 03-0413). On behalf of
defendants, the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, along with
thirty anti-poverty consumer, senior citizen, community, religious, civic,
immigrant and advocacy organizations, filed an amicus curiae brief. See Brief of
Amici Curiae Brennan Center for Justice, etc., HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d 6
(N.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 03-0413).
161
HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 8.
162
Gerald B. Silverman, Health Care Groups Sue New York to Overturn
Labor Organizing Law, 66 DAILY LABOR REPORT A-5 (2003).
163
HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d 6 (N.D.N.Y. 2005). The Machinist preemption
was promulgated in International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission. 427 U.S. 132 (1996)
(holding that the NLRA preempted the state labor board’s order enjoining the
union from refusing to work overtime for the employer because the NLRA
intended to leave unregulated the economic pressure asserted by the union in its
refusal to work the assigned overtime). The Second Circuit has determined the
applicability of the Machinist preemption in a few contexts. The Second Circuit
has held that New York State’s implementation of the prevailing wage
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employer’s ability to disseminate information to employees, which
amounted to a direct interference with the union organizing
process recognized by the NLRA.164 The Judge further held that
the market participant exception to preemption did not apply since
the State was acting in a regulatory, not proprietary, capacity.165
Judge McCurn did not reach the issue of the Garmon preemption,
nor did he address the constitutional questions raised by the
plaintiffs.166 The case is now on appeal in the U.S. Second

supplement through the annualization regulation was not prohibited by
Machinist preemption because it had no connection to labor/management
bargaining. Rondout Elec., Inc. v. N.Y. State DOL, 335 F.3d 162 (2d. Cir.
2003). In contrast, the Second Circuit held that Machinist preemption did
prohibit a state from refusing to register an electrical contractor’s apprentice
program due to ongoing negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement
between the union and contractors, because the refusal interfered with
bargaining. Bldg. Trades Emplrs. Educ. Ass’n v. McGowan, 311 F.3d 501 (2d.
Cir. 2002). In HANYS, Judge McCurn relied heavily upon the 9th Circuit’s
decision in Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Lockyer (Lockyer I), 364 F.3d
1154 (9th Cir. 2004) declaring that a California law prohibiting the use of state
funds to assist, promote or deter union activity was preempted by the NLRA
under the Machinist doctrine. Caher, supra note 141. Lockyer I was recalled for
reconsideration by the Ninth Circuit, and the prior opinion was withdrawn with
the Ninth Circuit affirming its decision in a three judge panel opinion. Chamber
of Commerce of the U. S. v. Lockyer (Lockyer II), 422 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 2005).
In this opinion the Ninth Circuit held that the California law was preempted
under both the Garmon and the Machinist doctrines and that the market
participant exception did not apply. Id. On January, 17, 2006, a majority of
nonrecused regular active judges ordered a rehearing en banc. Chamber of
Commerce of the U.S. v. Lockyer, Nos. 03-55166, 03-55169, 2006 WL 158673
(9th Cir. 2006). On February 9, 2006, the en banc court held that the opinion and
dissent in Lockyer II are withdrawn. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v.
Lockyer, Nos. 03-55166, 03-55169, 2006 WL 302357 (9th Cir. 2006).
164
Caher, supra note 141.
165
NLRA;
NLRA
PREEMPTION:
ANOTHER
LOOK
AT
THE
PROPRIETARY/REGULATORY DICHOTOMY; HEALTHCARE ASSOCIATION V.
PATAKI, 2005 U.S. DIST. LEXIS 9186 (N.D.N.Y. MAY 17, 2005), 5-7 BENDER’S
LABOR & EMP. BULL. 12 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 2005) [hereinafter
ANOTHER LOOK AT THE PROPRIETARY/REGULATORY DICHOTOMY].
166
Caher, supra note 141. The First Amendment and due process issues
arising from the provisions contained in Section 211-a are beyond the scope of
this Note.
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Circuit.167
On appeal, the State contends that Section 211-a is not
preempted under the Machinists doctrine because the statute
simply places limitations on the use of state funds and employers
are free to use their own private funds for union-related
activities.168 According to the State, the statute does not impose
employer neutrality, and as such it does not regulate in a field that
the NLRA intended to be left unregulated.169 Should the Court of
Appeals decide to reach the issue of the Garmon preemption, the
State maintains that Section 211-a is not preempted under this
theory because neither the NLRA nor precedent provides
employers with an affirmative right to present their views to
employees.170 In any event, the State asserts that Section 211-a
would be saved from preemption under the market participant
exception because the State is acting as a market participant under
Section 211-a by seeking to ensure that its appropriated funds are
used solely for their designated purpose.171
IV. NLRA PREEMPTS SECTION 211-A
Due to Section 211-a’s interference with employer free speech,
which is arguably protected by Section 8(c) of the NLRA and
committed to the NLRB’s jurisdiction, the NLRA preempts
Section 211-a under the Garmon preemption, should the Second
Circuit decide to reach this issue.172 Neither the peripheral concern
exception to the Garmon preemption nor the local interest
exception saves Section 211-a from preemption. Since the district
court in HANYS correctly concluded that the NLRA preempts
167

Press Release, Chamber of Commerce, Chamber Welcomes Ruling that
Upholds Employer Rights Businesses Retain Right to Discuss Unionization with
Workers
(Sept.
8,
2005),
http://www.uschamber.com/press/
releases/2005/september/05-146.htm.
168
Reply Brief for Defendants-Appellants, supra note 117, at 1.
169
Id.
170
Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 42, HANYS, No. 05-2750 (2d Cir.
argued Feb. 10, 2006).
171
Reply Brief for Defendants-Appellants, supra note 117, at 15.
172
Appellees’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 46, at 48-50.
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Section 211-a under the Machinist preemption and that it is not
saved from preemption by the market participant exception, it did
not address whether the statute was also preempted under the
Garmon preemption.173 Section 211-a’s core spending provisions
as well as its enforcement, sanction, and record-keeping provisions
are preempted under the Machinist doctrine due to their chilling
effects on employer free speech, which runs counter to the
Congressional intent to leave unfettered fundamental aspects of the
labor-management relationship.174 The market participant
exception to both strands of preemption is inapplicable to Section
211-a because an application of the Cardinal Towing test reveals
that New York State is regulating labor relations, rather than acting
as a proprietor or market participant.175
A. NLRA Preempts Section 211-a Under the Garmon
Preemption
The Garmon preemption prohibits state regulation of conduct
that is arguably protected by the NLRA.176 A close look at the
legislative history and relevant case-law leads to the conclusion
that section 8(c) of the NLRA arguably protects employer free
speech rights177 and that the NLRB has primary jurisdiction over
employer speech through its administration of union representation
elections.178 Section 211-a’s restriction on state funding is
preempted under the Garmon doctrine as an impermissible
interference with the ability of employers to express their views on
unionization to employees in the context of a union organizing
173

HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 25.
Appellees’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 46, at 35.
175
HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 19-20 (holding that under the first and
second prongs of the Cardinal Towing test, New York State is acting as a
regulator under Section 211-a).
176
See supra Part II.B.1.
177
Ian M. Adams & Richard L. Wyatt, Jr., Free Speech and Administrative
Agency Deference: Section 8(c) and the National Labor Relations BoardAn
Expostulation on Preserving the First Amendment, 22 J. CONTEMP. L. 19, 26-27
(1996).
178
Appellees’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 46, at 51.
174
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campaign.179 Nor is Section 211-a saved from preemption by either
of the two exceptions to the Garmon doctrine.
1. Interference with Employer Speech Rights
The central issue to the Garmon preemption’s application to
Section 211-a is whether employer speech rights are actually
protected by the NLRA in that they constitute an affirmative right,
or at a minimum are arguably protected.180 Section 8(c) of the
NLRA is titled: “Expression of views without threat of reprisal or
force or promise of benefit,”181 and provides that:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the
dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic,
or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an
unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this
Act, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or
force or promise of benefit.182
The relevant precedent and legislative history of the adoption
of section 8(c) of the NLRA demonstrates that employer free
speech is protected, or at least arguably protected, by the NLRA.183
The NLRB, soon after it was created, essentially required that
employers take a neutral stance during an election campaign.184
The Supreme Court opposed this requirement in NLRB v. Virginia
Electric & Power Co., holding that the First Amendment protected
the expression of non-coercive, anti-union views by employers.185
179

Braid, supra note 17.
See Reply Memorandum of Law at 4, HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d 6
(N.D.N.Y 2005) (No. 03-0413), available at 2004 WL 3522317.
181
29 U.S.C. § 158(c).
182
Id.
183
Adams & Wyatt, supra note 177, at 26-27.
184
2-34 LABOR & EMP. LAW § 34.01 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 2005).
185
Id. See NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 477
(1941) “The employer in this case is as free now as ever to take any side it may
choose on this controversial issue. But certainly conduct, though evidenced in
part by speech, may amount in connection with other circumstances to coercion
within the meaning of the Act. If the total activities of an employer restrain or
coerce his employees in their free choice, then those employees are entitled to
the protection of the Act.” Id.
180
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However, the NLRB continued to hold that employers violated the
NLRA when they expressed these anti-union viewpoints.186
Congress thereby amended section 8(c) of the NLRA to clearly
articulate the free speech rights of both employers and unions.187
After the adoption of section 8(c), the NLRB articulated that it may
invalidate an election if it found that the parties engaged in
objectionable conduct which rendered free choice by the
employees unlikely.188 The Supreme Court recognized that the
congressional intent behind the establishment of section 8(c) was
to encourage free debate on issues in which labor and management
contain opposing viewpoints.189 In NLRB v. Gissel Packing
Company, Inc., the Supreme Court further held that an employer is
free to communicate to its employees its views on unionizing as
long as the communications do not violate the express provisions
of section 8(c), which prohibit threats of reprisal or force or
promise of benefit.190 Section 8(c) is therefore commonly referred
to as the employer “free speech” provision.191
The Second Circuit has recognized that employers may express
their opposition to the unionization of their workforce, and in
expressing such views they are entitled to free speech protection
under section 8(c) of the NLRA.192 According to the Second
Circuit, section 8(c) embodies the First Amendment right of
186

LABOR & EMP. LAW § 34.01, supra note 184.
Id. The legislative history of section 8(c) demonstrates that it was
enacted “‘to insure both to employers and labor organizations full freedom to
express their views to employees on labor matters.’” See Memorandum of Law
at 8, HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 6 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 03-0413), available at 2003
WL 24152875 (citing S. Rep. No. 80-105, at 23-24 (1947)). The drafters of
section 8(c) clearly expressed their purpose in formulating 8(c) as preventing the
Board from: “‘attempt[ing] to circumscribe the right of free speech [even] where
there were also findings of unfair labor practices.’” Adams & Wyatt, supra note
177, at 26 (citing 93 Cong. Rec. 6601 (1947)).
188
LABOR & EMP. LAW § 34.01, supra note 184 (citing NLRB v. General
Shoe Corp., 192 F.2d 504 (6th Cir. 1951).
189
LABOR & EMP. LAW § 34.01, supra note 184.
190
1-5 LABOR & EMP. LAW § 5.05 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 2005)
(citing Gissel, 395 U.S. at 617-19).
191
Id.
192
Beverly Enters., Inc. v. NLRB, 139 F.3d 135, 140 (2d Cir. 1998).
187

CHARISH MACROED CORRECTED 07-30-06.DOC

810

7/30/2006 12:35 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

employers to freely communicate to their employees any of their
opinions about unionism in general, or any of their views about a
particular union, provided that the communications do not assert a
threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.193 Providing the
employer with the opportunity to communicate freely with its
employees not only affirms the employer’s right to freedom of
speech, but it also supports the employees by enabling them to
make informed decisions.194 The Second Circuit has also noted that
in drafting section 8(c), Congress sought to ensure that an
employer’s lawful speech was not chilled “by preventing the
[NLRB] from using anti-union statements, not independently
prohibited by the [NLRA], as evidence of unlawful motivation” in
a union organizing campaign.195 The Second Circuit’s continued
acknowledgement and perpetuation of employers’ freedom of
speech, and its recognition that this right is embodied in section
8(c), demonstrates that New York courts have construed section
8(c) as conferring speech rights on employers.
The defendants in HANYS argued that the NLRB lacks the
power to affirmatively protect employer speech, and thereby the
Garmon preemption does not apply to Section 211-a.196 This
argument ignores well-settled Supreme Court precedent
recognizing the Board’s competence to judge the impact of
statements made in the context of the labor management
relationship.197 For instance, in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Company,
Inc., the Supreme Court suggested that it may be appropriate for
reviewing courts to defer to the NLRB’s inferences as to the
lawfulness of the content of employer speech under the NLRA,
since the NLRB has competence in this area.198 Moreover, the
NLRB has explicitly stated that it was chosen by Congress to
193

Kinney Drugs v. NLRB, 74 F.3d 1419, 1428 (2d Cir. 1996).
Id.
195
Holo-Krome Co. v. NLRB, 907 F.2d 1343, 1347 (2d Cir. 1990).
196
See Brief of Amici Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., et. al.,
supra note 160, at 21 (citing Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to
Dismiss at 18, HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d 6 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 03 Civ. 0413),
available at 2003 WL 24152872.
197
Adams & Wyatt, supra note 177, at 32.
198
Id.
194
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regulate employer speech in the representation and unfair labor
practice areas, and as such state regulation of this activity is
impermissible.199 The HANYS defendants also contend that section
8(c) does not provide an affirmative employer free speech right,
but rather is drafted as an exception to the prohibition against
unfair labor practices.200 Since the NLRA does not include noncoercive employer speech in any category of speech deemed an
unfair labor practice, however, employers are free to engage in
non-coercive speech.201 Furthermore, the NLRB has articulated
that national labor policy provides employers and unions with the
freedom to voice their opinions on unionization in a non-coercive
manner.202
In their argument against an affirmative right to employer free
speech, the HANYS defendants argued that the source of the
employer’s right of free speech is the First Amendment, rather than
section 8(c) of the NLRA.203 This position ignores precedent and
legislative history, which both demonstrate that section 8(c)
protects and embodies the employer’s first amendment right to free
speech.204 Significantly, in Gissel, the Supreme Court treated the
employer’s right of speech, which is presumably preserved in both
the First Amendment and section 8(c), as a statutory right.205 The
enactment of section 8(c), therefore, has resulted in the NLRB
examining employer speech by referencing the language of this

199

See Brief for the National Labor Relations Board as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees and in Support of Affirmance at 22, HANYS, No.
05-2570 (2d Cir. argued Feb. 10, 2006) [hereinafter NLRB Amicus Curiae
Brief].
200
See Reply Memorandum of Law, supra note 180, at 4.
201
Id.
202
See NLRB Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 199, at 19 (citing Linn v.
Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 62 (1966) (noting that section 8(c) manifests
Congress’ intent to protect free debate from state regulation); Trent Tube Co.,
147 NLRB 538, 542 (1964) (holding that absent threats, the NLRB will not
restrict the right of unions and employers to inform employees of their views on
unionization).
203
HANYS, 388 F. Supp 2d at 22.
204
Adams & Wyatt, supra note 177, at 26-27.
205
Id. at 34.
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section and Gissel, rather than the First Amendment.206
Section 211-a appears to impede on the affirmative freedom of
speech conferred upon employers by the NLRA and recognized by
the Second Circuit. The statute applies to all state contracts,
regardless of amount.207 Employers whose budgets are entirely or
primarily derived from state funds, principally those in the human
or social services industries, are affected by Section 211-a’s speech
limitations.208 Such employers may find themselves unable to
exercise their rights to inform employees of their views of
unionization during an organizational campaign.209 As a result of
Section 211-a, employees would likely only hear the views of
union organizers, which creates a coercive bias toward
unionization.210
Healthcare providers, as employers, further assert that Section
211-a decreases the value of their speech rights. The healthcare
providers in New York who are largely, if not completely, funded
by New York State have complained that Section 211-a impeded
them from speaking freely with their employees during
unionization campaigns, thereby preventing healthcare workers
from being afforded the opportunity to hear both sides of the
unionization debate.211 New York State’s argument that the
employers can use their own private funds aside from state grants
towards unionization efforts212 is inapplicable to these employers,
because these employers do not have private funds available with
206

Id.
Kaplan, supra note 140.
208
See Brief of Amici Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., et. al.,
supra note 160, at 10. See also Braid, supra note 17.
209
See Brief of Amici Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., et. al.,
supra note 160, at 17.
210
Braid, supra note 17.
211
Poltenson, supra note 28, at 1.
212
Prior to Governor Pataki signing the 2002 Bill suggesting the
amendments to Section 211-a, the Governor’s Counsel, James McGuire,
requested comments on the Bill from Kathy Bennett, the Chief of the Legislative
Bureau of the Attorney General’s Office. In a memorandum, Bennett responded
that the Bill merely prevents employers from using state funds to engage in any
of the prohibited activities. Independence Residences, Inc. N.L.R.B. no. 29-RC10030 (June 7, 2004), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/legal/decisions/.
207
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which to fund communications regarding unionization.213
2. Section 211-a Does Not Fall Under Either of the Two
Exceptions to Garmon Preemption
Both exceptions to the Garmon preemption are inapplicable to
Section 211-a. First, the peripheral concern exception does not
apply here because in this case, the employers’ free speech rights
are not peripheral to the NLRA.214 Rather, free speech rights are
firmly established in section 8(c) of the NLRA as demonstrated by
legislative history, congressional intent, and case law precedent.215
A prime concern in the drafting of section 8(c) was the right to
open debate in the face of a union organizing campaign, and the
employees’ right to hear both sides of the debate.216 Thus, it
appears that the concern about open debate and free speech rights
is a fundamental component of the NLRA.
Second, the local interest exception, which allows states to
regulate where the feelings of strong local interests are involved,
also is inapplicable. The local interest exception can be found in
the traditional law of torts whereby states are permitted to grant
compensation for violent or threatening conduct.217 All of the
antecedents to the local interest exception cited in Garmon were
cases in which violence, intimidation, and obstruction of property
213

See Frederick D. Braid Aff. ¶ 15, HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d 6 (N.D.N.Y.
2005) (No. 03-0413) (arguing that in an NLRB election at Independence
Residences Inc., the employer, which was virtually entirely dependent on
government funding, could only utilize private contributions that were not
specified in the means in which they could be used, in its efforts to communicate
with employees during organizing campaigns.). But see Brent Garren Aff. ¶ 32,
HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d 6 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 03-0413). (arguing that in an
NLRB election at Independence Residences, Inc. (IRI), the employer, which was
virtually entirely dependent on state funding, complied with Section 211-a’s
provisions and waged an aggressive anti-union campaign that sufficiently
provided its employees with relevant information about unionization.).
214
See Brief of Amici Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., et. al.,
supra note 160, at 23.
215
See id.
216
Id.
217
LABOR AND EMP. LAW § 36.05, supra note 83.
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served as the basis for state regulation.218 However, in subsequent
decisions the court expanded the scope of the exception to include
defamation actions that arise in the context of labor disputes and
actions for intentional infliction of emotional harm.219 Section 211a does not address tort claims nor does it relate to violent or
threatening conduct, which is the primary context with which this
exception has been raised.220 Section 211-a also does not fit the
further exceptions carved out in other areas for the exception.
Likewise, the law is not deeply rooted in local feeling, and it is
therefore not saved from preemption by the local interest
exception.221 Thus, the NLRA preempts Section 211-a under the
Garmon doctrine and Section 211-a is not saved from preemption
by the two carved out exceptions.
B. NLRA Preempts Section 211-a Under the Machinist
Preemption Doctrine
The Machinist preemption prohibits state regulation of
fundamental aspects of the collective bargaining process which
Congress intended to be left “to be controlled by the free play of
economic forces.”222 Section 211-a’s core spending restriction
interferes with non-coercive speech by employers, which is
counter to the Congressional intent to protect free debate from
regulation in the context of a union organizing campaign.223 The
enforcement, sanction, and record-keeping provisions found in
Section 211-a further chill employer free speech by imposing
disincentives and compliance burdens.224
1. Congress Intentionally Left the Area of Employer Speech
218

Id.
Id.
220
Id.
221
See Brief of Amici Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., et. al.,
supra note 160, at 24.
222
See NLRB Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 199, at 19 (citing
Machinists, 427 U.S. at 140).
223
Id.
224
Id. at 17.
219
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Unregulated
When state action has an impact on the labor-management
relationship, it does not necessarily follow that this action would
impede the effective implementation of the NLRA’s policies.225 As
recognized by the Second Circuit, the Machinist preemption
applies only where the state action regulates the use of economic
self-help weapons that may be utilized by the employer or union
during a labor dispute, such as strikes, lockouts, or slowdowns,
which are recognized and protected under the NLRA.226 State
interference with substantive aspects of the bargaining process to
an extent that Congress would find unacceptable is preempted
under the Machinist doctrine.227 State laws of general applicability,
such as the regulation of labor conditions, usually are not
preempted by the NLRA, whereas state regulations that target a
process central to the union organizing and collective bargaining
system established by the NLRA are generally preempted.228
The Machinist preemption applies to Section 211-a because the
law in effect regulates an employer’s ability to engage in noncoercive speech to express its views regarding union
organization.229 An employer’s ability to engage in non-coercive
speech is conduct that Congress sought to be left unregulated in
furtherance of the NLRA’s policies.230 Employers may want to
convey to their employees the possible disadvantages of
unionization, such as the costs to employees of union dues and
fees, and whether a particular union has a record of corruption,

225

HANYS, 388 F. Supp 2d at 21 (citing New England Health Care,
Employees Union, District 1199 v. Rowland, 221 F. Supp. 2d 297, 328 (D.
Conn. 2002) (quoting New York Tel. Co. v. New York St. Dept. of Labor, 440
U.S. 519, 531 (1979))).
226
HANYS, 388 F. Supp 2d at 21 (citing Rondout Elec., Inc. v. N.Y. State
DOL, 335 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2003)).
227
Id.
228
Alcantara v. Allied Properties, LLC, 334 F. Supp. 2d 336, 342
(E.D.N.Y. 2004) (quoting Lockyer I, 364 F.3d at 1167).
229
HANYS, 388 F. Supp 2d at 22.
230
Id.
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violence, racial discrimination, or misrepresentation.231 Although
Section 211-a does not prevent employers from utilizing private
funds for these activities, the reality is that the state government is
often the largest source, and in certain instances virtually the only
source, of funding for many employers, especially in the healthcare
industry.232 Absent the ability to train supervisors and
administrative personnel, compensate personnel, and hire attorneys
and consultants in efforts to convey the employer’s message on
union organizing, the employer may be left without assistance in
expressing its views on unionization in a manner that will not
render unfair labor practice charges.233 Consequently, the flow of
information to employees which may help them decide whether
unionizing is in their best interests is hindered, thereby working at
cross-purposes with the federal law which was designed to foster
informed decisions by employees on unionization.234 The core
statutory language of Section 211-a, which prohibits encouraging
or discouraging union organization, therefore interferes with the
union-organizing process recognized by the NLRA by restraining
free debate regarding union organization.235 Section 211-a’s
interference with non-coercive employer speech during a union
organizing campaign restricts an area that Congress intended to be
left unregulated.
2. Section 211-a’s Enforcement, Sanction, and Record-Keeping
Provisions Further Support Preemption
Aside from Section 211-a’s core spending provisions
prohibiting state funds from being used to encourage or discourage
union organization, Section 211-a’s enforcement, sanction, and
record-keeping provisions directly and negatively affect the union

231

See Memorandum of Law, supra note 184, at 9.
See Brief of Amici Curiae New York State Association of Health Care
Providers, et al. in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees and Affirmation of the
District Court, at 4 n.5, HANYS, No. 05-2750 (2d Cir. argued Feb. 10, 2006).
233
See NLRB Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 199, at 26.
234
See Reply Memorandum of Law, supra note 180, at 3.
235
HANYS, 388 F. Supp 2d at 22-23.
232
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organizing process.236 The enforcement provisions could feasibly
result in an injunction which, if it occurs during a union-organizing
campaign, may have a disruptive effect on the employer’s ability
to voice its opinion to employees.237 Also, unions can press the
Attorney General to investigate alleged claims of misuse of state
funds.238 In fact, the Attorney General has audited employers for
compliance with Section 211-a during union organization
campaigns, and some of these audits occurred due to union
requests.239 Consequently, employers risk being accused of
misspending state funds in any instance in which they speak about
the merits of union organization, thereby deterring employers from
speaking freely on such merits.240 The balance of power between
unions and employers would therefore be interrupted because the
mere threat of enforcement would empower the unions to extract
concessions from employers in negotiating recognition
agreements.241
An additional problem is that sanctions for Section 211-a
violations can be punitive in nature, including increased fines for
knowing violations or criminal penalties.242 These punitive
sanctions are at odds with the sanctions imposed by the NLRA for
violations, which are strictly remedial.243 Additionally, threatening
employers with fines and criminal penalties if they use state
payments to discourage unionization is contrary to the employers’
rights under federal labor policy, which entitles employers to

236

Id.
Id.
238
See Greenberg Traurig, Greenberg Traurig Alert: Ninth Circuit Rules
that California’s “Neutrality Statute” is Preempted by the National Labor
Relations Act, (Sept. 2005), http://www.gtlaw.com/pub/alerts/2005/09 04.asp.
239
NLRB Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 199, at 17 n.8.
240
Greenberg Traurig, supra note 238.
241
NLRB Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 199, at 17 n.8.
242
Id. at 22.
243
Id. (citing NLRB v. Jamaica Towing, Inc., 632 F.2d 208, 212 (2d Cir.
1980); “Punitive sanctions are inconsistent . . . with the remedial philosophy of
the NLRA.” Wisconsin Dept. of Industry, Labor and Human Relations v. Gould,
475 U.S. 282, 288 n.5 (1985)).
237
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discourage union representation in a number of circumstances.244
Before the HANYS decision in 2005, the NLRB noticed Section
211-a’s potential conflict with the concept of free debate under the
NLRA. In a letter to the New York State Labor Commissioner on
October 30, 2002, Margery E. Lieber, NLRB Assistant General
Counsel for Special Litigation, expressed to the Commissioner the
NLRB’s concerns over Section 211-a’s impact on employers’ free
speech rights in union-organizing drives.245 The letter noted:
[I]t appears that the labor neutrality law will effectively
regulate conduct that is intended by Congress to be free
from governmental interference.
For example, the law imposes a requirement of
employer neutrality during union organizing drives by
restricting state funds from being used to encourage or
discourage unionization (Section 2); imposes a burdensome
record-keeping requirement for those employers who
choose not to remain neutral (Section 3); and imposes
substantial risk of punitive civil penalties and Attorney
General prosecution of employers for any perceived
violations of its provisions (Section 4). These provisions,
taken together, appear to go well beyond New York’s
choice not to fund certain conduct as they interfere with
rights under the NLRA to freely discuss labor relations
issues during union organizing.246
Thus, the NLRB asserted that since Section 211-a directly
regulates the union-organizing process itself, and imposes
substantial compliance costs on employers who participate in that
244

See id. at 18 (noting that employers have the right to discourage
representation where a union seeks recognition in an inappropriate bargaining
unit, where the union insists upon representing supervisors or managers, or
where the union uses coercive tactics).
245
See Brief of Amici Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., et. al.,
supra note 160, at 3.
246
Id. (citing letter dated Oct. 30, 2003, from the NLRB to Commission or
Labor Linda Angello). The Acting General Counsel of the NLRB, Arthur
Rosenfeld, also expressed his belief that New York’s “union neutrality” law
should be struck down because it “is a political ploy that undermines federal
Labor Law.” Independence Residences, Inc. N.L.R.B. no. 29-RC-10030 (June 7,
2004), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/legal/decisions/.
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process, the statute interferes with an area Congress intended to
leave free of state regulation and thereby is preempted under the
Machinist doctrine.247
C. Section 211-a is Not Precluded from NLRA Preemption by
the Market Participant Exception
In applying the two factors of the Cardinal Towing test, it is
evident that the market
participant exception is inapplicable to Section 211-a because
New York State is acting as a regulator rather than a proprietor or
market participant. First, despite the proprietary purpose
articulated in the statute, New York State is not acting as a
proprietor by concerning itself with employers’ use of state funds
subsequent to the provision of services and by restricting
employers’ spending of their own money.248 The State is also
regulating labor relations by discouraging employers from voicing
their views on unionization during an organizing campaign.249
Second, Section 211-a is regulatory in nature because it involves
broader policy setting through its application to all state
contracts.250 Hence, Section 211-a is not saved from NLRA
preemption.
In addressing the first issue under Cardinal Towing, whether
Section 211-a reflects New York State’s interest in its efficient
procurement of needed goods and services, the New York district
court in Legal Aid Society v. City of New York articulated that the
objective effects, rather than the subjective motivations, of the
challenged state action ought to be gauged by determining
“whether the action functions to promote a particular labor policy
in general or else to serve legitimate proprietary needs within a
more discrete setting.”251 Furthermore, in Aeroground, Inc. v. City
and County of San Francisco the district court held that the air
247

HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 23.
Appellees’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 46, at 22-23, 27.
249
HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 20.
250
Id. at 17.
251
Legal Aid Society v. City of New York, 114 F. Supp. 2d 204, 237
(N.D.N.Y. 2000).
248
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commission’s declaration that the purpose of its card check rule
was a proprietary interest in the revenues resulting from the
efficient operation of the airport, could not defeat the actual
application of the rule.252 Therefore, while the legislature
articulated that the purpose of Section 211-a was to ensure that
scarce public resources were used solely for their intended
purposes (i.e., to benefit the public), which it deems is proprietary
in nature, the subjective motivations of the State are irrelevant;
rather, the objective effects of the statute are to be considered.253
Even if we were to consider the subjective motivations, the
legislative history provides ample reason to believe that Section
211-a was not enacted for financial reasons alone. While the State
insists that the purpose of the legislation is to safeguard public
money and not to lower barriers to union organization, business
employers who oppose New York’s union neutrality law have
cited speeches by labor officials and their political allies’
legislation as evidence that the law’s actual purpose is to enhance
unionization, not to protect the integrity of public money.254 The
Bill that served as the basis for the enactment of the Section even
declares that the purpose of the legislation was to prohibit state
funds from being utilized to finance activities contrary to the right
of employees to organize and to engage in collective bargaining.255
Section 211-a is also not automatically characterized as
proprietary merely because it addresses the financial interests of a
public entity256 or because it involves a state’s spending power.257
In Aeroground, the court held that while the commission may have
intended the rule to be for a strictly financial purpose, “simply
addressing the financial interests of a public entity does not make
252

Aeroground, Inc. v. City & County of San Francisco, 170 F. Supp. 2d
950, 958 (D. Cal. 2001).
253
HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 19 (citing N.Y. LAB. LAW § 211-a(1)).
254
Logan, supra note 48, at 190.
255
Assemb. 8058, 219 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1996).
256
ANOTHER LOOK AT THE PROPRIETARY/REGULATORY DICHOTOMY,
supra note 165.
257
Wis. Dep’t. of Indus., Labor and Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., 475
U.S. 282, 287 (1986) (holding that there is no validity to the distinction between
a state’s regulatory power and a state’s spending power).
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such efforts those of a market participant.”258 New York State is
not acting in a proprietary role because particularly in the Medicaid
context Section 211-a places restrictions on the use of state funds
once a contract has already been awarded, as opposed to setting
prices for services.259 It is unlikely that private parties would be
concerned with the recipient’s use of its payments for goods and
services that have already been provided.260 Section 211-a
regulates employers’ spending of their own money because
Medicaid reimbursement for services previously rendered is the
facility’s money, and hence the state does not have a proprietary
interest in the funds.261 In addition, since a large portion of these
Medicaid payments derive from federal and local sources, the state
has no proprietary interest over these funds when they merely pass
through the state treasury for administration to employers.262
In looking beyond Section 211-a’s recitation of a proprietary
interest, it is evident that Section 211-a is a regulatory decision that
alters national labor policy by seeking to stifle the employers’
exercise of free speech rights.263 Other states have addressed
similar issues and have found the market participation exception
inapplicable. For instance, in New England Health Care,
Employees Union, District 1199 v. Rowland, the district court of
Connecticut held that the state’s anticipatory subsidies and use of
state resources during nursing-home strikes constituted regulatory
actions that were focused on the broad policy-oriented interest of
ensuring the health and safety of the public, and as such the state’s
actions were not considered to be proprietary.264 According to the
258

Aeroground, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 958.
Brief of Amicus Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 25, HANYS, No. 05-2750 (2d Cir.
argued Feb. 10, 2006). See Michael Parker Aff. ¶ 36, HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d 6
(N.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 03-0413) (explaining that the State reimburses for
services already rendered by paying Medicaid providers after it has already
received a service in the quality and quantity for which it had contracted).
260
Appellees’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 46, at 27.
261
Id. at 22-23.
262
Id. at 26-27.
263
Id. at 28.
264
New England Health Care, Employees Union, District 1199 v. Rowland,
259
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court, where the policy decisions constituted regulation that had a
discernible impact on the bargaining relationship between labor
and management, the market participant exception is not fitting.265
Likewise, Section 211-a is a regulatory scheme that focuses on the
state’s economic well-being, and has an impact on the labormanagement relationship.266 Despite its facially neutral language,
the statute affects the policy of neutrality in labor relations by
fostering one-sided debate in union organizing campaigns.267 The
statute essentially permits unions to actively participate in union
organization campaigns, while curtailing the ability of employers
to voice their opposition to unions.268
For the second Cardinal Towing factor, courts often look to the
scope of the state’s conduct in deciding the application of the
market participant exception.269 If a state’s activity is focused on
one specific project, courts usually determine that the state is
acting in a proprietary capacity.270 On the other hand, where the
221 F. Supp. 2d 297, 327 (D. Conn. 2002).
265
Id. at 328.
266
HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 19 (“Section 211-a ‘by its design sweeps
broadly to shape policy in the overall labor market’ . . . [and is an] ‘important
part of the state’s system for safeguarding the public fisc.’”) (quoting Lockyer I,
364 F.3d at 1163); Brief of Brennan Center for Justice et. al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Defendants at 2, HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 030413), available at 2003 WL 24152867.
267
ANOTHER LOOK AT THE PROPRIETARY/REGULATORY DICHOTOMY, supra
note 165 (citing HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 20).
268
Id.
269
Befort & Smith, supra note 8, at 117-18.
270
Id. at 117. See also Cardinal Towing & Auto Repair, Inc. v. City of
Bedford, Tex., 180 F.3d 686, 693 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that a city was acting
as a proprietor when it passed and enforced an ordinance involving contract
provisions for bidders for the city’s towing services); Boston Harbor, 507 U.S.
at 232 (holding that a state agency was acting as a proprietor when it contracted
for the construction of sewage treatment and other facilities that it would own
and manage); Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Mills, 283 F.3d 404, 420-21 (2d Cir.
2002) (holding that the School District acted as a proprietor where it entered into
a single lease agreement with respect to a single building that required the
provider of wireless communication services to certify that it was in compliance
with FCC regulations). But see Building and Construction Trades Department,
AFL-CIO v. Allbaugh, 295 F.3d 28 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (determining that an
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state’s conduct is akin to policy setting, courts typically construe
the state’s activity as regulation.271 In Boston Harbor, the Supreme
Court held that a bid specification that was specifically tailored to
one particular project did not constitute regulation.272 The New
York district court in Van-Go Transport Co. v. New York Board of
Education distinguished the case from Boston Harbor in holding
that New York City Board of Education’s policy of refusing to
conditionally certify replacement workers was regulatory because
the policy extended beyond the contract in issue through its
industry-wide effect of restricting the ability of contractors to hire
strike replacement workers, which is an established federal right.273
Likewise, the New York statute has a broad scope and encourages
a general policy rather than narrowly seeking to address a specific
proprietary problem.274 Section 211-a applies to all state contracts,
regardless of the amount of funding.275 In this respect, Section 211a is even broader in scope than California’s Neutrality Statute,
which was not implicated unless the state funds exceeded a
specified monetary floor of $10,000.276 Hence, the market
participant exception is not applicable to Section 211-a.
V. PROHIBITING EMPLOYERS FROM USING STATE FUNDS FOR
UNION-RELATED ACTIVITIES WILL HAVE A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN NEW YORK STATE
Section 211-a is discernibly one-sided in favor of unions, and
is effectively a measure
executive order constituted proprietary action even though the order constituted
a blanket, across-the-bard rule that was uniformly applied to government
contractors). Allbaugh, however, may be inconsistent with the holdings of other
market participant cases. Befort & Smith, supra note 8, at 119.
271
Befort & Smith, supra note 8, at 117 (citing Dillingham Const. N.A.,
Inc. v. County of Sonoma, 190 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the state
acted as a regulator where it established an apprentice prevailing wage law that
was not created for a particular project)).
272
Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. at 232.
273
Van-Go Transp., 53 F. Supp. 2d at 288.
274
HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 17.
275
Id.
276
Id. at 18.
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designed by New York State to use its purchasing power to
impose neutrality on employers during union organizing
campaigns,277 as evidenced by the statute’s history and impact. The
law originated from the vigorous lobbying efforts of two politically
influential unions—the Service Employees International Union and
the AFL-CIO.278 While the unions pushed for Governor George
Pataki to sign Section 211-a, employer groups were strongly
opposed to the law.279 Section 211-a’s effects also favor unions, as
demonstrated by Judge McCurn’s holding in HANYS that: “despite
its facially neutral language, section 211-a effects the policy of
neutrality in the labor arena. It does this by in essence allowing
unions to actively participate in union organization campaigns,
while at the same time significantly curtailing the ability of
employers to voice their opposition to unions.”280
The troublesome result of New York Labor Law Section 211a’s imposition of neutrality on employers is the significant
disruption of the National Labor Relations Act’s recognized and
purposeful balance of the employer’s speech rights against the
union’s speech rights.281 The NLRA designates that the NLRB
conduct a secret-ballot election to resolve disputes over union
recognition.282 Inherent in that process is an opportunity for both
unions and employers to convey their views on unionization to
employees before the election is held.283 The NLRA has a policy of
encouraging vigorous debate between labor and management,
which is considered an important means toward ensuring that
employees make informed decisions about union representation.284
As a result of the balance of speech rights among labor and
management in pre-election communications to employees, unions
277

NLRB Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 199, at 4.
Appellees’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 46, at n.6 (citing U.S. Court
Rejects California Labor Neutrality Law, ALBANY TIMES UNION, Sept. 27,
2002, at B2). See also Loomis, supra note 131.
279
See supra Part III.A.
280
HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 20.
281
See Lewis, supra note 7.
282
See NLRB Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 199, at 20.
283
Braid, supra note 17.
284
Id.
278

CHARISH MACROED CORRECTED 07-30-06.DOC

7/30/2006 12:35 PM

PREEMPTION OF NEW YORK LABOR LAW

825

historically won approximately 55% of the secret ballot elections
conducted by the NLRB.285 When employer neutrality is imposed,
however, there is a wide disparity in election results, with unions
winning an appreciably greater number of elections.286 This result
illustrates the disruptive effect of union neutrality laws in the area
of labor management relations. Proponents of neutrality
agreements and card check, however, maintain that these methods
of union organizing are preferable to NLRB-supervised
elections.287 The supporters stress that these agreements account
for more new union members than NLRB election victories,
largely due to the diminishment of employers’ anti-union speech or
conduct during election campaigns.288 Critics of neutrality
agreements and card check counter that employee free choice can
only be realized through a vibrant election campaign supervised by
the NLRB, in which both the employer and the union inform
employees of their views on unionization.289
The provision in Section 211-a specifically prohibiting the use
of state funds to train supervisors or managers regarding methods
to encourage or discourage unionization, or to hire or pay attorneys
or consultants to encourage or discourage union organization
impedes employers’ efforts to engage in the full range of activities
and speech that the NLRA and NLRB permit during a union
organizing campaign.290 In the wake of the aggressive agenda
285

Lewis, supra note 7. See also Barker, supra note 33, at 34 (noting that
unions win secret ballot elections about half the time).
286
Lewis, supra note 7 (noting a 1999 AFL-CIO study concluding that
unions win 84% of elections when employers are bound by agreements
containing one-sided neutrality provisions). See also Barker, supra note 33, at
34 (stating that it has been estimated that as many as 90% of the instances in
which a card-check or neutrality agreement is in place, the union has obtained
the status of bargaining representative).
287
James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition:
Prospects for Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 22 (March 2005)
(asserting that the NLRB election paradigm should be restructured or completely
replaced by alternative approaches, such as card check and neutrality
agreements).
288
Id. at 830, 832.
289
Id. at 841.
290
Michael Parker Aff., supra note 259, at ¶ 14.
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announced by the AFL-CIO and the Change to Win Coalition to
revitalize the unions through lobbying and wide-scale organizing
efforts, employers may require legal advice on the new tactics
employed by the labor unions and the lawful responses
management may provide to employees’ questions about unions,
as well as advice in the development of a strategy to respond to an
aggressive approach from the unions.291 Also, the NLRB has
recognized the significance of unrestricted access to attorneys and
well-trained managerial staff as a means of fostering its goal of
prompt resolution of representation disputes.292 According to the
NLRB, attorney advice may assist employers in bringing forward
evidence of unfair labor practices of the petitioning union, in
communicating to its employees in a lawful manner, and in
promptly correcting any mistakes in expressing its views.293
Supervisors and managers may also find it increasingly
necessary to become educated about their rights to communicate
with employees about the employer’s philosophy on unions.294
Since supervisors have direct contact with employees, they are the
most essential personnel in communications with the employees,
and they are in the best position to make a determination as to
critical issues the employer should address and information that
needs to be clarified or emphasized.295 Therefore, by placing
restrictions on state funding for advise, counseling, and training
which are lawful under the current federal labor relations scheme,
Section 211-a interferes with the NLRA’s policy for labor
management relations.
291

Stief & Treacy, supra note 18. See Unions and Management
Representatives Disagree on Extent of Consultants’ Influence, 75 DLR C-1,
April 19, 1988 (providing an estimate by a management labor relations attorney
that 99% of companies retain attorneys or management consultants when faced
with a union organizing drive “because they don’t know how to react legally or
practically.”).
292
NLRB Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 199, at 25.
293
Id. at 26 (citing NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 270, 277 (1973);
ITT Lighting Fixtures, Div. of ITT Corp. v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1983);
Columbia Alaska Reg’l Hosp., 327 NLRB 876, 877 (1999)).
294
Stief & Treacy, supra note 18.
295
Frederick D. Braid Aff., supra note 213, at ¶ 21.
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In addition to Section 211-a’s core spending provision
prohibiting employers from using state funds to discourage or
encourage unionization, the statute’s record-keeping and penalty
provisions further have a chilling effect on employers’ ability to
communicate their views to employees during an union election
campaign. The President of the Healthcare Association of New
York State, which was the main plaintiff in HANYS, expressed his
frustrations with the state record-keeping requirements by asserting
that healthcare providers were finding it impossible to separate
state funds from federal monies expended to treat a Medicaid
patient.296 If hospitals are thereby unable to comply with the
record-keeping requirements, they are in violation of Section 211-a
and can face harsh penalties.297 As a result, employers, especially
nonprofit healthcare providers, may be intimidated into deciding
not to oppose the union-organizing effort in order to avoid being
charged with violating Section 211-a and then having to deal with
the difficulties proving that they are not using state dollars on labor
consultants.298 Section 211-a thus effectively prevents employers
from exercising their free speech rights during a unionization
campaign.299 An affirmation of the district court’s ruling in HANYS
will guarantee that employers that are largely funded by the state
government are able to provide their employees with factual
information and freely communicate their views during a
unionization campaign to the same extent as other employers,
thereby allowing workers to hear both sides of the unionization
debate and make an informed decision about whether they want
union representation.300
296

Coalition Of Health Care Employers Urges Federal Government To Act
Against State Employer Gag Law, HANYS (Jan. 7, 2003),
http://www.hanys.org/communications/pr/010703pr.cfm.
297
Id.
298
Seanna Adcox, Pataki Signs Bill Barring Use of Public Funds to Fight
Union Organizing Efforts, MENTAL HEALTH E-NEWS (Oct. 1, 2002),
http://www.nyaprs.org/pages/view_enews.cfm?enewsid=2152.
299
Coalition Of Health Care Employers Urges Federal Government To Act
Against State Employer Gag Law, HANYS (Jan. 7, 2003),
http://www.hanys.org/communications/pr/010703pr.cfm.
300
D’Ambrosio, supra note 44.
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Section 211-a’s chilling effect on speech is imposed even on
employers who receive a significant portion of funding from
private sources.301 An examination of California’s Neutrality
Statute is particularly instructive with regard to Section 211-a.302
The practical effect of California’s Neutrality Statute’s
compliance, enforcement, and penalty provisions was to force
employers who received grants from the State to remain neutral
during union-organizing campaigns by placing significant
restrictions on employers’ rights to spend money on otherwise
legal, non-coercive means of communicating their views on
unionization to employees.303 In California, unions used the
Neutrality Statute’s enforcement provisions to obtain bargaining
leverage in labor disputes, while the Statute’s intended purpose—
to provide recovery on claims for funds spent on union organizing
activities in violation of the statute—fell to the wayside.304
There exists a substantial record containing numerous instances
where labor unions in California leveraged the significant
compliance burdens of the Neutrality Statute as a means of
enhancing their bargaining position against employers.305 After the
enactment of California’s Neutrality Statute, unions in California
sought to coerce employers into refraining from hiring consultants
and attorneys, and from communicating their views about
unionization to employees, by sending threatening complaints
containing allegations of employer violations of the statute to the
employers and the California Attorney General’s office, many of
which provided no factual support.306 For example, one union
allegation of a violation of the Neutrality Statute contained little
factual support, and even contained an offer to settle the alleged
violation if the employer agreed to enter into a neutrality

301

See Braid, supra note 17.
Although the Lockyer II decision was withdrawn and the case is
currently being reheard by the en banc court, the record for California’s
Neutrality Statute was laid out by the 9th Circuit in Lockyer I.
303
Greenberg Traurig, supra note 238.
304
Id.
305
Lockyer II, 422 F.3d at 980.
306
Id. at 980-81.
302
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agreement with the union.307 Several lawsuits were also filed
against employers pursuant to the Neutrality Statute by
California’s Attorney General and by the unions themselves.308 In
one case, the Service Employees International Union, Local 399,
which at the time of the suit was a member union of the AFL-CIO,
alleged that a nursing home unlawfully used state funds to deter
union organizing by its employees, as well as failed to maintain
financial records sufficient to demonstrate that the funds were not
used towards union organizing efforts.309 The Service Employees
International Union furthermore pressed various employers who
received funding from the California government to either permit
unionization or otherwise face penalties under the Neutrality
Statute,310 which demonstrates the pro-union impact of California’s
law.311
What occurred in California foreshadows the likely effects of
Section 211-a should the law be permitted to remain in force.
California’s Neutrality Statute and Section 211-a contain very
similar provisions.312 Both laws mandate that employers must
maintain financial records in order to demonstrate compliance.313
Penalties imposed by the laws include rescission and civil penalties
for those employers who commit knowing and repeated
violations.314 One difference between the statutes is that
California’s Neutrality Statute includes a state taxpayer suit
provision, which provides for private enforcement of the statute.315
While Section 211-a lacks such a provision, it permits the state
attorney general to seek an order restraining the employer’s

307

Id. at 980.
Id. at 981.
309
Id.
310
Id.
311
Id. at 982.
312
See HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 23 (noting that “section 211-a and the
Lockyer statute are remarkably similar”).
313
Id. at 24 (noting that the mandatory record keeping provisions in both
statutes are similar).
314
Id.
315
Id.
308
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commission of the alleged violation.316 If such state action occurs
during a union organizing campaign, it may very well have the
same disruptive effect as a taxpayer lawsuit.317 Moreover, when
the Service Employees International Union brought suit against a
nursing home in California, it premised a cause of action in its
lawsuit that did not rely on California’s Neutrality Statute’s private
enforcement provision.318 Rather, it alleged that the nursing
home’s misuse of state funds gave the union a cause of action for
injunctive relief and restitution on behalf of the State of
California.319 Therefore, unions could potentially sue under New
York State law to enforce Section 211-a’s restriction on the use of
state funds.320
In fact, in a few instances prior to the challenge to Section 211a brought in HANYS, the unions brought complaints to the
Attorney General about alleged employer Section 211-a
violations.321 For example, in response to a complaint brought by
the Union of Needletrades Industrial and Textile Employees
(UNITE) alleging Section 211-a violations, the New York State
Comptroller informed an affiliate of United Cerebral Palsy
Associations of New York State, (CPANY) one of the plaintiffs in
HANYS, that it would be initiating an investigation of its use of
both state and county funds during its organization campaign,
without mentioning to CPANY the supposed illegal conduct.322
Should the Second Circuit not find that Section 211-a is
preempted, it is more than likely that these complaints will
multiply as they did in California, inevitably inhibiting the ability
of employers to engage in the election campaign.323
316

Id. (citing N.Y. LAB. LAW § 211-a(4)).
Id.
318
Lockyer II, 422 F.3d at 981.
319
Id.
320
Id.
321
Appellees’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 46, at 56.
322
Michael Parker Aff., supra note 259, at ¶ 16. The letter stated that the
Comptroller received a report detailing allegations with respect to misuse of
public funds. Letter from Leonard A. Mancusi, Special Assistant to the
Comptroller, to Katie Meskell, Executive Director of CPANY, Oct. 10, 2003.
323
Appellees’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 46, at 56.
317
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Proposals for union neutrality legislation similar to those
passed by California and New York have been introduced in the
legislatures of numerous other states.324 However, should the Ninth
Circuit agree with its vacated opinion in Chamber of Commerce of
the United States v. Lockyer, which declared that the California
Neutrality Statute was preempted under both the Machinist and the
Garmon doctrines, this holding will likely signal an end to the
trend of state legislation imposing employer neutrality during
union organizing campaigns.325 An affirmation of HANYS would
further signal to other states that legislation setting forth spending
limitations that impede employers’ free speech rights during union
organizing campaigns are preempted by the NLRA.326 An
affirmation would also provide employers in New York receiving
state funds with the freedom to communicate their views on
unionization to employees in a non-coercive manner without fear
of incurring substantial penalties, and the restoration of a level
playing field in contested union organizing campaigns by fostering
open debate.327 Furthermore, should the Second Circuit not affirm
the HANYS decision, the likely resultant proliferation of state union
neutrality laws differing in the restrictions they impose on labor
activities would subject multi-state employers to differing rules as
to their spending of state funds, the books and records they need to
keep, and the penalties to which they would be subjected for
violating the statutes.328 This development would frustrate
Congress’ purpose in establishing a uniform national labor
policy.329
On the other side, should the Second Circuit decide to affirm
HANYS, the unions may construe Section 211-a’s preemption as a
crippling setback to their efforts to reverse the declining trend in
324

Lockyer II, 422 F.3d at 981.
Greenberg Traurig, supra note 238. See also Lewis, supra note 7.
326
Id.
327
Braid, supra note 17.
328
Appellees’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 46, at 42. See also NLRB
Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 199, at 22 (noting that Board elections would
be conducted differently in states having union neutrality agreements from those
who do not).
329
Id. at 43.
325
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union membership. The unions have insisted that the utilization of
labor consultants and labor attorneys by employers during
organizing campaigns has constituted a significant reason for the
decline in union membership and the decrease in union success
rates in NLRB elections.330 Union advocates maintain that the
NLRA’s ideological underpinnings are to favor and promote union
organization, yet employers focus on the NLRA’s protection of
informed employee choice with regard to whether they desire
union representation.331 The latter value is inherent in the system
of labor relations imposed by the NLRA, and resultantly allows for
free debate and the active opposition of American employers to
union organizing efforts as a means of ensuring that employees are
not receiving one-sided, biased information on unionization.332
Some commentators point to the NLRA’s facilitation of employer
opposition, through its use of representation elections as the
preferred method of determining union majority status, as a
contributing factor to the steep decline of unionization in the
United States.333 Employers are therefore permitted under the
NLRA to wage an anti-union campaign with the only proviso
being that threats, coercion, or promise of benefits are
impermissible.334 Unions claim, however, that employers abuse
330

Unions and Management Representatives Disagree on Extent of
Consultants’ Influence, 75 DLR C-1, April 19, 1988. The unions consider
seminars offered by consultants on such topics as union decertification to be
union busting techniques, and have asserted that labor lawyers are becoming
more involved in union prevention tactics. Id. However, this explanation for the
union decline has been refuted by employers, attorneys, and consultants who
contend that the decline in union membership is due to a myriad of other
significant factors. Id.
331
Peter M. Panken, supra note 26, at 425.
332
Befort, supra note 17, at 371 (stating that the active opposition of
employers to union organizing efforts is a unique attribute of the American
system of labor relations).
333
Id. at 371-72 (noting that the NLRA’s electoral model differs from other
industrialized countries. Whereas such countries employ a system in which
employers must automatically bargain with a union, in the United States an
employer is not obligated to bargain with a union until it demonstrates majority
status in a representation election. Id.)
334
Id. (referring to the provisions in NLRA section 8(c)).

CHARISH MACROED CORRECTED 07-30-06.DOC

7/30/2006 12:35 PM

PREEMPTION OF NEW YORK LABOR LAW

833

this system by engaging in unlawful conduct and delaying and
obstructing organizing drives.335 Studies on whether employers’
anti-union tactics in fact influence election outcomes is
conflicting,336 and Arthur Rosenfeld, Acting General Counsel of
the NLRB, has maintained that the decline in union membership is
not necessarily due to unfair tactics by employers.337
Despite the conflicting views of the effects of the NLRA’s
procedures for union organizing, under national labor policy as it
presently exists, both the unions and employers have the freedom
to voice their opinions regarding union representation in a noncoercive manner and employees have the freedom to become
informed about both the advantages and disadvantages of
unionization.338 The liberty to campaign in the workplace may be
validly waived by either the union or employer, but solely in
instances where the waiver constitutes a voluntary choice resulting
from bargaining.339 Section 211-a is therefore at odds with federal
labor policy as it currently exists.340 Should the unions believe that
union neutrality laws are an effective and important mechanism for
bolstering union membership, they ought to lobby Congress to
amend the NLRA directly or to write exemptions into other
laws.341
335

Fred O. Williams, NLRB Wants State’s ‘Union Neutrality’ Law Struck
Down, BUFFALO NEWS (May 10, 2003) at C-1.
336
Befort, supra note 17, at 372 (citing conflicting empirical studies). See
Paul C. Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to SelfOrganization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983), in SAMUEL
ESTREICHER & STEWART J. SCHWAB, FOUNDATIONS OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW 105-11 (Foundation Press 2000) (contending that the decline
in union success in representation elections is largely due to deficiencies in the
NLRA, namely that it does not eliminate coercive antiunion employer tactics).
337
Williams, supra note 335.
338
NLRB Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 199, at 19.
339
Id. at 20 (citing Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475
U.S. 608, 619 (1986).
340
See NLRB Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 199, at 30 (stating that
Section 211-a essentially rewrites the NLRA).
341
See id. (noting that Congress alone has the authority to revise the
NLRA). In fact, amendments to the NLRA which would alter the Board’s
representation process were proposed in 1977 and 1978, but were subsequently
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CONCLUSION
Section 211-a directly interferes with the NLRA’s policy of
open debate as a method of providing employees with information
in union representation elections.342 The law effectively deprives
employees of their employer’s viewpoint when they are
considering unionization.343 The law thereby imposes a bias
toward unionization by leaving union organizers free to
communicate to employees the advantages of unions, while
employers’ free speech rights to provide the opposing viewpoint
are diminished.344 Since this regulation is an impermissible
interference with federal regulation of labor management activities,
Section 211-a is fully preempted by the NLRA.345
The determination made by the Second Circuit in its
consideration of the State’s appeal
from the district court’s holding in HANYS is likely to have a
pronounced effect on labor relations in New York State. If the
Second Circuit upholds the district court’s decision, employers will
be free to use state funding to either encourage or discourage union
organizing activities. Employers contend that this freedom will
restore the balance between labor and management by allowing
employees contemplating joining a union to hear both sides of the
unionization debate.346 Since organized labor in New York viewed
the law as a means toward curbing the problem of public subsidy
of anti-union campaigns,347 they will have to look to methods other
than neutrality laws to achieve this goal.348
rejected by Congress. Id. at 4. More recently, the Employee Free Choice Act,
H.R. 1696, 108th Cong. (2005) has been introduced to Congress, and seeks to
advocate neutrality and card-check processes that would essentially eliminate
the traditional process of government conducted secret-ballot elections.
342
See Appellees’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 46, at 37.
343
Braid, supra note 17.
344
Id.
345
Id.
346
Caher, supra note 141.
347
Logan, supra note 48, at 187.
348
Id. Other methods can include responsible contractor legislation or
legislation expanding collective bargaining coverage, which do not raise
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The State laments the district court’s decision as an affront to
its discretion in placing restrictions on the spending of state
funds.349 However, the mere fact that the State is using its spending
power is insufficient to save Section 211-a’s interference with the
NLRA and its subsequent preemption, because Congress would
not have intended to permit a state to overtake the NLRA’s federal
scheme of law, remedy, and administration simply because the
state was using its spending power.350 As recognized by the district
court in HANYS, while
ensuring ‘essential state-funded services for the most
vulnerable New Yorkers’ is a laudable goal . . . ‘the State
must take care that, in its zeal to act, it does not do so
unnecessarily and outside the permissible bounds of its
discretion and thereby tread on the federally protected zone
of labor rights.’351

preemption or constitutional issues, and may prove more effective at
circumventing aggressive anti-union campaigns. Id. at 189.
349
Caher, supra note 141.
350
See NLRB Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 199, at 5.
351
HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 25 (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae Brennan
Center for Justice, etc. at 1, HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d 6 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (No.
03-0413); New England Health Care, Employees Union, District 1199 v.
Rowland, 221 F. Supp. 2d 297, 345 (D. Conn. 2002)).

